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Abstract 
 
Following the economic recession in 1985-86 but prior to the Asian Financial Crisis in the third 
quarter 1997, accounting in Malaysia appeared to have been energised with major amendments 
of the Companies Act 1965, activation of the statutory accounting body Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (MIA) and talks over the setting up the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB). This study attempts to find out the reality of these changes and the reasons behind 
this reality. By applying the political economic approach to accounting (Cooper & Sherer, 
1984) and with data obtained from primary and secondary source documentation and in-depth 
interviews, it is found that superficial accounting changes had taken place: Companies Act 
amendment on additional auditor reporting duty was lacking in enforcement, the revived MIA 
acted inadequately as accounting regulator; and, the MASB was established with no enforce-
ment capability. These changes were consistent with and stemmed from Malaysia's social, eco-
nomic and political attributes which were supported by the elite class. 
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Introduction 
 
A year after the Malay Federation 
gained its independence from Britain in 
1957, twenty local accountants set up 
the Malayan (later Malaysian) Associa-
tion of Certified Public Accountants 
(MACPA) (see Azham, 2001a). Not 
long after the Federation of Malaysia 
was created in 1963 comprising the Ma-
lay Federation and the British colonies 
of Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore, the 
Parliament passed Companies Act 1965 
and the Accountants Act 1967. The 
passing of the Accountants Act 1967 has 
led to the establishment of the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants (MIA) with the 
responsibility (as stated in Section 6 of 
the Accountants Act) to regulate the 
practice and promote the interests of the 
profession.   
 
Azham Md. Ali is a lecturer at the Faculty of Accountancy, Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM). He is presently an Asso-
ciate Professor in the Audit and Governance Unit of the faculty. Email: azham@uum.edu.my 
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Unfortunately, the MIA was hardly ac-
tive in the next two decades of its exis-
tence (see Azham, 2001b). This time 
period coincided to a large extent with 
the implementation of the nation’s New 
Economic Policy (NEP) by the govern-
ment. With the MACPA whose power is 
limited to only a fraction of the total 
number of accountants in the country 
was at centrestage, there emerged vari-
ous problems in the nation’s accounting 
arena. These included the proliferation 
of unqualified accountants, the nonexis-
tence at the national level of a common 
code of ethics binding "all" accountants 
and related machinery to investigate and 
discipline errant behaviour, the shortage 
of qualified accountants and the minimal 
disclosures in corporate annual reports. 
 
Later in the 1980s, amendments were 
made to the Companies Act 1965 in 
1985 and the MIA activated in 1987. 
After several years of polemic, in 1997, 
the government had set up the Malaysian 
Accounting Standards Board (MASB) to 
overtake the MIA's authority over the 
setting of accounting standards in the 
country. This paper attempts to detail 
out the changes taking place and their 
reality that emerged in the ten-year pe-
riod after the (unofficial) end of the NEP 
in the mid-1980s to the beginning of 
Asian Financial Crisis in the third quar-
ter of 1997. Just as important, this paper 
attempts to determine the factors that led 
to the problematic state of accounting 
during the period.  
 
For that matter, the theory of political 
economy of accounting (Cooper & 
Sherer, 1984) is applied. It is a view of 
accounting embedded in interests and 
conflicts and points towards the need to 
supplement the marginalistic analysis of 
competitive markets with political and 
social concepts in order to gain deep 
understanding of the functioning of ac-
counting in Malaysian society. Thus, the 
theory looks at the accounting function 
within the broader structural and institu-
tional environment in which it operates. 
 
For data collection, the case study re-
search method is utilised (see Yin, 1994; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994; Ryan et al., 
1992; Patton, 1990; and Scapens, 1990). 
Qualitative data which come in the form 
of "words", "phrases", "sentences" and 
"narrations" are gathered from primary 
and secondary source materials and from 
in-depth interviews of selected partici-
pants taking place in first half of 1997 
(see the list in Appendix 1). To avoid the 
so-called the "elite bias" (talking only to 
high-status interviewees), numerous in-
formal talks with a number of people 
who were at the peripheries of the sub-
ject under study were also conducted. 
Insights from the informal talks and an-
swers coming from a list of open-ended 
questions sent out to the former finance 
minister, Tun Daim Zainuddin1, are 
added up to those coming from the 
documents and interviews.  
 
In the accounting field, numerous schol-
ars argue that qualitative research meth-
ods provide rich descriptions of the so-
cial world, particularly the meanings 
attached to actions in the language of 
actors. In short, they argue that qualita-
tive methods help in understanding how 
accounting meanings are socially gener-
ated and sustained. These scholars in-
clude Humphrey & Scapens (1992), 
Ryan et al. (1992), Ansari & Bell 
(1991), Scapens (1990), Covaleski & 
Dirsmith (1990), Smith et al. (1988), 
1 
He earlier had agreed to be interviewed.  But due to 
some timing problems, this interview had at the end 
failed to take place. 
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Kaplan (1983, 1984, 1986), Hopper & 
Powell (1985) and Hopwood (1983).   
 
The reminder of this paper is comprised 
of five sections. The first delineates the 
theoretical framework.  The second dis-
cusses the three main changes taking 
place in the post-NEP era in the nation’s 
accounting arena. The third pinpoints the 
myriad of problems and uncertainties in 
the accounting arena. By applying the 
theory of political economy of account-
ing, the following forth section is an at-
tempt to explain the reasons behind the 
less than healthy state of accounting. 




The Theoretical Framework 
 
The conceptual or theoretical framework 
is the political economy of accounting 
introduced by Tinker (1980) and refined 
by Cooper & Sherer (1984). Tinker 
(1980) introduces a classical political 
economic approach to financial report-
ing. He proposes that the social relations 
of production work together with the 
economic forces of production as two 
related dimensions of capital shaping the 
social and economic life of a nation. In 
recognising the presence of social rela-
tions, it would make it less cumbersome 
to understand the economic forces of 
production that are operating at any par-
ticular time period and in any society. 
Tinker (1984) explains that such rela-
tions are reflected through a set of insti-
tutional forms and arrangements that are 
constructed to interact with economic 
relations (i.e. the type of economy). Ac-
cordingly, in order to understand what is 
going on in the economic sphere, which 
may include the accounting function, 
there is a need to identify the related 
socio-economic and institutional envi-
ronment. Interpretation of a nation's spe-
cific economic features will be less ade-
quate if insufficient attention is given to 
the surrounding social and political 
processes. 
 
Thus, Cooper & Sherer (1984) have 
pointed out that a political economy of 
accounting is useful for understanding 
how the accounting process interacts 
with its social, economic and political 
environments.  They write (p. 208): 
 
... the objectives of and for account-
ing are fundamentally contested, 
arises out of recognition that any ac-
counting contains a representation of 
a specific social and political context. 
Not only is accounting policy essen-
tially political in that it derives from 
the political struggle in society as a 
whole but also the outcomes of ac-
counting policy are essentially politi-
cal in that they operate for the benefit 
of some groups in society and to the 
detriment of others. 
 
This leads to the assumption that there 
exists no basic harmony of interests in 
society where power is widely diffused 
and which results with the unproblem-
atic view of the social value of account-
ing reports. Instead, accounting practice 
is viewed as favouring specific dominant 
interests in society and disadvantaging 
others. Dye (1986) argues that a cohe-
sive "power elite" exercise authority 
over a variety of institutions. This elite is 
comprised of a small group of dominant, 
authoritative individuals or entities. The 
elite functions through, among other 
things, interlocking directorships, inter-
locking institutional experiences and 
similar social backgrounds. However, 
instead of a single power elite, Dye 
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(1986) says that a society may have dif-
ferent groups of individuals or entities 
that exercise power in its various sec-
tors. Thus, leadership or authority is dis-
persed. More importantly perhaps it is 
not unusual for the elites to be in conflict 
with each other. In relation to account-
ing, both views of elitist domination and 
pluralist anarchy signify the contested 
value of the accounting reports and prac-
tices. In other words, accounting reports 
are hardly impartial and objective, nor is 
the accountant in the position of a disin-
terested and innocuous historian.  
 
Besides the presence of power-play in 
society, Cooper & Sherer (1984) say that 
another important variable affecting the 
value of financial accounting reports is 
the specific historical and institutional 
environment comprising the social and 
political structures and cultural values of 
the society that provide the context for 
the delivering of the accounting reports.  
In short, historical specificity is crucial 
in coming out with a fair assessment of 
the social value of the accounting func-
tion.   
 
All in all, the application of a political 
economy approach leads to the recogni-
tion of the presence of both apparent and 
hidden purposes underlying accounting 
process taking place in a specific locale 
and time period. The apparent, structural 
purpose reflects the proclaimed needs of 
a society.  It provides the "right" func-
tionalist kind of impression. The more 
hidden underlying purpose associated 
with social relations on the other hand 
ensures the maintenance of the status 
quo.  In short, it protects the underlying 
power arrangement.  As a result, there is 
a difference in what the elite say and do 
(and perhaps also what is in their mind) 
in the matter of accounting. This is as 
stated by Argyris & Schon (1974): 
"Espoused theories" are what people say 
they do and the "theory-in-use" is what 
really happens. In getting a clear under-
standing of an accounting process a 
greater focus on social relations purpose 
is needed, for it is assumed that in any 
locality and a specific time period the 
social relation goal is always successful 
in modifying the structural purpose.   
 
In the next section, the three most im-
portant changes taking place in Malay-
sia’s accounting arena during the post-
NEP era are described. Two took place 
at the beginning of the era and the third 
one just before Malaysia began to suffer 
from the quagmire of the Asian Finan-
cial Crisis 1997-98. These changes pro-
vide the appearance that at long last a 
new accounting era had emerged, befit-
ting the so-called transfer of responsibil-
ity from government to private sector as 
the nation’s engine of the economy.  
 
 
Accounting Transformations  
 
The first accounting development of in-
terest took place with the amendments 
made to the Companies Act 1965 in 
1985.  This is followed by the activation 
of the statutory accounting body MIA 
with its first AGM in September 1987. 
Ten years later, the government with the 
passing of the Financial Reporting Act 
of 1997 set up the MASB to overtake the 
MIA's authority over the setting of ac-
counting standards in the country.  
 
The 1985 Amendment to the Compa-
nies Act 1965.  With the power to regu-
late company law is vested in the Fed-
eral Legislature under the Malaysian 
Federal Constitution, the Companies Act 
1965, which became effective on 15 
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April, 1966, brings together company 
legislations which prevailed in the com-
ponent states in 1963 when Malaysia 
was created (Azham, 2001a). At the be-
ginning, as shown in the Parliamentary 
Debates (Vol II, no. 8, 9 Aug. 1965, Col. 
1558), the Companies Act 1965 had two 
objectives: to protect investors and to 
attract “foreign investors” into the coun-
try. Later, after two decades have 
passed, in 1985, the Companies Act was 
substantially revised (Helinna & 
Wishart, 1989). The revised Act became 
effective from 1 February 1986. As 
mentioned by a number of interviewees, 
the 1985 amendment as a whole was 
intended to attract foreigners to invest in 
the country, through placing greater em-
phasis on the need for those associated 
with companies to be more accountable 
to the minority shareholders, who would 
include the foreigners. 
 
Thus, in the revised Companies Act, 
extensive changes are made to the exist-
ing Ninth Schedule to incorporate those 
elements that are regarded as best ac-
counting standards and practices leading 
towards a much higher disclosure level 
than previously.  For example, compa-
nies now are required to prepare funds 
statement (statement of changes in fi-
nancial position) together with the in-
come statements and balance sheets that 
the auditors have to report on. Also, the 
1985 amendment requires for the first 
time all public accounting firms and the 
individual partners of such firms to reg-
ister with the Registrar of Companies 
(ROC).  Each partner is allocated a num-
ber that must be cited in all audit reports. 
In addition, the term of an audit license 
is reduced from three to two years and 
the procedure of granting licenses over-
hauled to make it a more effective 
method of monitoring and policing stan-
dards of auditing.   
 
Finally, an auditor is required to report 
to the ROC if he or she were to find that 
there has been a breach or non-
observance of any provisions of the Act.  
The onus is on the auditor to justify why 
he has not reported a breach of the Act 
to the Registrar. This seems to be a ma-
jor break with the tradition in Malaysian 
Company Law based as it is on the Brit-
ish system2, although it is contained in 
the corresponding sections of the Aus-
tralian and Singaporean Acts. Failure to 
report could result in a requirement for 
the auditor to justify in a court of law his 
or her opinion that the breaches have 
been otherwise adequately dealt with by 
either one of these two approaches: by a 
comment about such matter in his or her 
audit report or by bringing the matter to 
the attention of the company directors. 
The fulfilment of either of these two ap-
proaches ensures that the reporting duty 
of an auditor to the Registrar is a limited 
one.   
 
The Activation of the MIA in 1987. 
When the Malaysian Parliament passed 
the Accountants Act 1967 in September 
that year, the MIA came to existence as 
a statutory body (Azham, 2001a). Sec-
2 Walton (1986) says that the Malaysian Act drew 
mainly on two sources: the Victoria Companies Act of 
1961 and the British Companies Act of 1948. The 
former in turn was based upon UK Companies Act 
1908, 1929 and 1948, while the latter on UK Compa-
nies Act 1929. However, in the Parliamentary Debates  
(Vol. II, no. 8, 9 Aug. 1965, Col. 1558), it was stated 
by the then minister of commerce and industry, Dr. 
Lim Swee Aun, that the committee with the responsi-
bility to draft the Companies Bill (whose chairman 
came from the ministry of commerce and industry and 
with the assistance of John Finemore, a Colombo Plan  
draftsman from Australia) had considered not only the 
present legislation in force in the UK, Australia, India 
and New Zealand, but also the draft code prepared for 
Ghana by Professor Gower and the reports presented 
in the UK by the committees chaired by Lord Cohen 
and Lord Jenkin. 
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tion 6 of the Act provides a list of the 
various functions of the MIA.  The MIA 
is in short supposed to be the body to 
promote and regulate the accounting 
profession in the country. Unfortunately, 
hardly any part of the Act except for the 
establishment of the MIA council and 
the appointment of its heads had taken 
place in the reminder of the decade.  
And it may safely be said that nothing 
substantial had actually taken place in 
the following decade of 1970s except for 
the passing of Accountants' Rules in 
1972 which, however, were not enforced 
due to the nonexistence of the statutory 
investigative and disciplinary commit-
tees which could only be formed after an 
AGM.   
 
Being inactive did not however stop the 
leaders of the MIA to conduct a series of 
discussion with those from the MACPA 
to have the two bodies “merged” to form 
Malaysian Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants (MICA) (Azham, 2001b). But, 
on 17 June 1985, the federal cabinet re-
jected the establishment of MICA 
(Business Times, 12 Oct. 1988). The rea-
son given was that there was no need for 
MICA for there was already in the coun-
try an accounting body entrusted with all 
the needed task to spearhead the ac-
counting profession in the form of the 
MIA (MIA 1967-87 Annual Report, p. 
11)3.  Two years later, what should have 
taken placed two decades earlier finally 
occurred: MIA had its first AGM in Sep-
tember 1987. It appears that the govern-
ment was instrumental in having the 
MIA activated. Said the MIA president 
on the day before the MIA's inaugural 
AGM (The Malaysian Accountant, Oct-
Dec 1987, p. 9): "The ball has now been 
tossed into my hands as the new Presi-
dent of MIA and my brief has been to 
activate the MIA into a full professional 
body representing all accountants in the 
country." See also Akauntan Nasional 
(Aug. 1992, p. 25). 
 
The exact reasons for the MIA to be ac-
tivated were revealed on pages 5-6 of a 
set of untitled bounded documents found 
in the MIA library which was stamped 
on its first page as "Confidential" and 
dated 1 October 1988 and which appears 
to have been forwarded to the then fi-
nance minister by the MIA council to 
gain his approval for the various amend-
ments suggested for the Accountants Act 
1967 (from hereon it is known as the 
"MIA 1988 Bounded Document").  
Firstly, this document stated that the 
MIA was "directed" by the government 
to be active (after the federal cabinet 
rejected the MACPA proposal for the 
merger of the MACPA with the MIA) 
because of the state of the then account-
ing profession reflected in various finan-
cial scandals which resulted with a loss 
of confidence in the profession among 
the general public and “foreign business-
men” who were considered crucial for 
Malaysia to become an industrialised 
country.  Next, it stated that the govern-
3But from interviews, it was found that there would 
have been a merger if only those from the MIA and the 
MACPA were to agree with the terms set by the gov-
ernment. What happened was that the government 
would have agreed for the "merger" to take place if the 
new merged body MICA would have in its schedule list 
of recognised accounting bodies a number of govern-
ment sponsored accounting bodies and qualifications 
(where majority of the people involved happened to be 
bumiputras – see next footnote). The inclusion of these 
bodies and qualifications would ensure that those in-
volved could be taken in as public accountants and in 
turn would have them permitted to audit companies.  
But those leaders of the MIA and MACPA would have 
none of this. Their reluctance to agree to the terms set 
by the government led the latter to decide that there 
was no need for unification. Thus, there was no 
"outright" rejection by the government and that it was 
not due to the presence of the MIA that MICA could 
not come into reality. 
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ment would like the MIA to be activated 
due to the proliferation of unqualified 
accountants who had caused the govern-
ment to incur millions of ringgit of 
losses as a result of their falsification of 
their clients' accounts.  Thus, the MIA 
was now to play the regulatory role as 
expected of it when it was created two 
decades earlier.  This idea was clearly 
expressed by none other than the then 
finance minister on the night before the 
inaugural AGM of the MIA in 1987 
(The Malaysian Accountant, Oct-Dec. 
1987, p. 8): "As the Minister responsible 
for implementing the Accountants Act it 
is my hope that members of the Institute 
will make MIA an effective professional 
body responsible for looking after the 
professional standards, education and 
training and supervising over the profes-
sional conduct of members."   
 
The MIA 1988 Bounded Document had 
also mentioned some other reasons for 
the MIA to be active.  This concerned 
the need to increase the number of in-
digenous accountants and the use of the 
Malay language in the accounting pro-
fession. The report stated that the gov-
ernment was "horrified" and "saddened" 
to discover that up to 1984, there were 
less than five percent of the total quali-
fied accountants in the country who 
were “bumiputra”4.    
   
 
The Setting up of the MASB in mid-
1997.  For the two decades when the 
MIA laid low, the MACPA spearheaded 
the efforts of introducing accounting 
standards for local consumption 
(Azham, 2001b). Thus, it was as early as 
June 1972 that the MACPA issued State-
ment No. 1. Within the few years after 
Statement No. 1, the MACPA issued 
three more statements. Later in October 
1975, the MACPA was admitted as a 
member of the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC). Following 
its membership of the IASC, the 
MACPA in 1978 adopted the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards (IAS) 1 to 4 
(The Malaysian Accountant, July 1986, 
p. 11). Nevertheless, it appears that in 
implementing the IAS, the MACPA 
faced with a lot of non-compliance by 
companies leading to much diversity in 
accounting practices between industries 
and between companies in the same in-
dustry for both listed and unlisted com-
panies (Cooper, 1980; Megat, 1980, p. 
5). Worse problems appeared to have 
emerged when it concerned small busi-
nesses (The Malaysian Accountant, 
1980, pp. 45-46). 
 
Later in late 1980s, it appeared that 
nothing much had changed when it con-
cerned companies’ compliance with the 
IAS which were now adopted by the 
recently activated MIA. In 1989, Lee 
Hwa Beng, the MIA's chairman of the 
Financial Statements Review Committee 
(FSRC) mentioned that the review made 
recently on the accounts of 187 compa-
nies (selected on the basis of stratified 
sampling) had shown that "a large num-
ber of companies" did not comply with 
the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) (NST5, 20 May 
1989). Several years later Tay (1994) 
who conducted a study on financial in-
4The word “bumiputra” in direct translation in English 
is “sons of the soil”. The word denotes those with 
cultural affinities indigenous to the region as opposed 
to those known as immigrants who originated from 
outside the Malay archipelago. Thus,  bumiputra is 
comprised of three broad groups: the aborigines, the 
Malay-related and the ethnic groups residing in Sara-
wak and Sabah. Note however that the Constitution 
defines a Malay on a cultural instead of racial terms. 
That is, a Malay is “a person who professes the Mus-
lim religion, habitually speaks the Malay language, 
[and] conforms to Malay custom.” See Syed (1965, 
1985) and Chee (1983, Chapter One). 
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formation disclosure and accounting 
measurement methods of 30 smaller and 
larger KLSE-listed companies men-
tioned the same thing. Tay (1994) spe-
cifically stated that one possible problem 
faced by users of the financial state-
ments was the failure of companies to 
comply with legal and professional re-
quirements. Finally, just before Malaysia 
was caught up in the 1997-98 Asian Fi-
nancial Crisis, the vernacular newspaper 
Utusan Malaysia (8 July 1997) in its 
front page story reported that a number 
of companies was found to have filed in 
accounts with the ROC which were dif-
ferent to those which were laid out at the 
AGMs. And there were still other cases 
where accounts filed with the ROC were 
quite confusing in content while those 
sent to the Securities Commission (SC)6 
and the finance ministry were showing 
the very best of financial conditions. 
 
With all this in the background, it is not 
surprising to find that as early as 1987, 
Oh Chong Peng, who was a senior part-
ner of Coopers and Lybrand and later 
MACPA president, had raised the idea 
of the need for a separate committee to 
review companies' compliance with ac-
counting standards issued by a body 
which he labelled as the "Malaysian 
FASB" (Peng, 1987, p. 12):    
 
The next step should then be to en-
sure compliance with accounting 
standards. To do this, the FSR 
[Financial Statement Review Com-
mittee] must be given more authority. 
One way is for the FSR to be set up 
along the lines of the FASB, possibly 
as an off shoot of the FASB. The new 
independent FSR's main task will be 
to review all accounts but on a ran-
dom basis with special emphasis to 
the public with the authority to call 
for information on a very private and 
confidential basis.  
 
He pointed out that review of accounts 
would act as an "impetus" for companies 
to comply with accounting standards.  
He also said (p. 13): 
 
When set up, the new independent 
FSR should also be given the power 
to impose penalties in the form of 
fines and in the event of severe or 
recurrent failure to comply with ac-
counting standards, the FSR should 
also have the authority to recommend 
to the various Registrars to disqualify 
directors from holding office and to 
the licensing boards to remove or 
suspend audit licenses and to the ac-
countancy associations for discipli-
nary proceedings.   
 
Unfortunately, no one seemed to pay 
any attention to this suggestion of his 
which was made just before the MIA 
had its inaugural AGM. In fact, one 
could say from available evidence that in 
the later part of its active life, those at 
the helm of the MIA were rather satis-
fied with the quality of financial report-
ing in the country. For example, in 1993, 
the MIA's chairman of public practice 
committee (PPC) disagreed with a re-
mark made by "an accountant" at a con-
ference that Malaysia's corporate report-
ing was weak (Business Times, 17 Dec. 
5NST stands for the nation’s vernacular newspaper New 
Straits Times. 
6The SC was established in 1993 (Mohd.-Ariff, 1993; 
Mohd.-Salleh, 1993). The SC is given the task of pro-
moting the modernisation and ensuring orderly develop-
ment of the capital market in Malaysia. It regulates the 
issue of securities, designation of futures contracts and 
takeovers and mergers of companies. It is also responsi-
ble for supervising and monitoring the activities of any 
exchange, clearing house and central depository.  
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1993). This "accountant" mentioned the 
IASC's 1993 survey that identified Ma-
laysia as one of the countries lacking 
sufficient amount of disclosure. This 
survey placed Malaysia together with 
countries such as Japan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore for having less comprehen-
sive disclosures compared to countries 
such as UK, France and US.  The MIA's 
PPC chairman mentioned that such re-
mark could be damaging to the country 
in the effect that it would have on 
"foreign investors". He also appeared to 
think that to be in such category with 
Singapore and Hong Kong was not so 
bad.  Questions may be raised too as to 
the efficacy of the work conducted by 
the MIA (and for that matter the 
MACPA too) in reviewing financial 
statements. The MIA's Financial State-
ments Review Committee (FSRC) ap-
peared to have only published results of 
its review works for the years 1989 
(Akauntan Nasional, June 1989) and 
1994 (Akauntan Nasional, Apr. 1994). 
The MACPA's FSRC has not seemed to 
publish any over the years.  (See also 
Tay, 1994, pp. 242-243 in this matter of 
the FSRCs of the accounting bodies.) 
 
In the middle of all this mess, in 1994, 
the then finance minister came out to 
argue on the need to have high quality 
accounting standards in preparing the 
financial statements and to ensure com-
panies' directors complied with the stan-
dards. He also said that it was 
"unreasonable" and "unrealistic" to de-
pend on the accountants for high quality 
financial reporting since this was the 
responsibility of companies' directors 
(The Malaysian Accountant, June 1994, 
p. 14). Next he mentioned (pp. 14-15):  
 
As our financial and capital market 
become more sophisticated and as we 
strive to be world class competitors, 
we need to provide for tighter and 
more timely standards which can 
earn the support of preparers, audi-
tors and users alike by their quality.  I 
believe the time has come for us to 
consider the establishment of an Ac-
counting Standards Board backed by 
a body which can ensure stronger 
arrangements for securing compli-
ance and which has the financial re-
sources.  
 
The following year in October, during 
his 1996 budget speech, he announced 
that his ministry would set up the Finan-
cial Accounting Foundation (FAF) and 
the Malaysian Accounting Standards 
Board (MASB) as part of the govern-
ment's continuing strategy to develop the 
capital market (NST, 28 Oct. 1995). He 
also said that the establishment of 
MASB to formulate accounting stan-
dards and identify related areas of regu-
lation and "enforcement" would ensure a 
high level of financial reporting and dis-
closure in the corporate sector. He 
pointed out that with the maturity of the 
capital market and the further introduc-
tion of sophisticated financial instru-
ments, the level of "monitoring" needed 
upgrading and investors required protec-
tion by the government.   
 
A year later, in the midst of stiff opposi-
tion from the MIA over the idea of 
MASB because the latter’s existence 
would ensure that the task in setting ac-
counting standards would be effectively 
pull out from the former7 he mentioned 
7 
During an interview, an MIA council member men-
tioned that the MIA had made a presentation at the 
finance ministry to lobby against the setting up of the 
MASB - to no avail. In the presentation, the MIA 
“begged” the ministry to say what was wrong with the 
MIA in its accounting standard-setting efforts. The MIA 
also argued that it was the best party to handle account-
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that for the country to strive for 
"disclosure-based regulation" of its capi-
tal markets8 with greater emphasis on 
high standards and levels of disclosure 
leading towards "a financial reporting 
environment of international standard", 
the financial reporting standards "must" 
be accepted by the business community 
and not just by the accounting profession 
(NST, 8 Oct. 1996). He argued that in 
many countries the accounting profes-
sion together with the preparers, users 
and regulators had recognised that high 
quality accounting standards would 
emerge with the active participation of 
the relevant parties and that the process 
being made "independent" of any par-
ticular interest group including the ac-
counting profession (Business Times, 8 
Oct. 1996). He stressed that a mecha-
nism was needed that allowed the in-
volvement of all relevant parties in the 
financial reporting process. It is notable 
that all these arguments were supported 
about a week later by Sir Bryan Cars-
berg, the secretary-general of the IASC 
(NST, 16 Oct. 1996).  Apparently, the 
SC, which was directly responsible in 
the establishment of the MASB 
(Securities Commission 1995 Annual 
Report, p. 3), arranged for Sir Bryan 
Carsberg to issue a set of statements to 
the local newspapers. 
 
Later in late 1996, the Parliament passed 
the Financial Reporting Act 1997.  The 
Act states that the MASB would have 
eight members comprising the chairman, 
Accountant-General and six others with 
experience in financial reporting and in 
one or more of the following areas: ac-
counting, law, business and finance.  
Five out of these eight members shall 
also be members of the MIA. The Board 
is assigned three advisors coming from 
three regulatory authorities: SC, Central 
Bank and ROC. The functions of the 
MASB as listed in the Act are extensive 
and include the issuance of accounting 
standards, reviewing pre-existing ac-
counting standards to be issued as ap-
proved accounting standards and the 
development of a "conceptual frame-
work". The MASB is also required to 
ing standard-setting since it did not have any vested inter-
est in whatever way a standard came up to be. The MIA in 
short would be the independent party suited for such a task 
and not the MASB which would be comprised to some 
extent with parties from the listed companies, etc. who 
might do things to their benefits but which could damage 
the country somehow. Besides interviews, several docu-
mented sources provide evidence on the MIA’s opposition 
over the idea of MASB. Two examples: in 1995, the NST  
(11 Sept. 1995) quoted the MIA president saying:  "In the 
interest of the public and the country as a whole, we do not 
agree that the proposed MASB should be independent of 
the accounting profession and the institute". He proposed 
that instead of forming the MASB, it would be better to 
have the MIA's Accounting and Auditing Standards Com-
mittee to be upgraded as a Board with that of a review 
board was also set up to form an Accounting Standards 
Advisory Board (ASAB). The ASAB he said would 
greatly enhance the consultative process in accounting 
standards setting which many claimed was lacking at 
present. The second example is the Editorial to the MIA's 
official journal Akauntan Nasional  (January 1996).  Here, 
it was mentioned that the MIA was recently elected to the 
Board of IASC; thus, it signified that “Malaysia is held in 
high esteem internationally”. Next, it said that at the local 
level the MIA did not get similar treatment. It also said: “A 
public announcement on the formation of the independent 
accounting standards board was made while the Institute 
strongly believes that the accounting standards setting 
process should remain with accountants ... The Institute is 
indeed facing an issue which affects the very core of the 
accountancy profession .…” 
8The apparent exception took place in two occasions: one 
in 1992 when the MIA president was reported to say that 
the MIA had found from its recent investigation involving 
40 accountants that there were auditors who had failed to 
issue proper audit report (NST, 12 Apr. 1992). And another 
in 1993 under the headline "MIA Warning to Errant Mem-
bers" (NST, 28 Jan. 1993). But on closer inspection, the 
story involved members of MIA who colluded with un-
qualified accountants. Thus, this story was nothing new. It 
is because on this subject of collusion between members 
and those people unregistered, the MIA over the years was 
fond of issuing numerous statements to the media making 
one warning after another that stern action would be taken 
against its members with really no news whether actions 
had in fact been taken. See The Malay Mail  (4 Feb. 1988; 
26 Feb. 1992) and NST  (17 Sept. 1988; 31 Jan. 1991). 
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seek the FAF views for a number of its 
functions. Also, as mentioned in the Act, 
this FAF is comprised of 18 individuals 
including a chairperson appointed by the 
finance minister. Six out of these 18 in-
dividuals are the following people or 
their representatives: secretary general 
of the Treasury, Central Bank Governor, 
Securities Commission chairman, Com-
panies Registrar, KLSE executive chair-
man and MIA president. Another nine 
come from public listed companies (4), 
accounting firms (4), law firm (1). While 
the MASB has variety of functions, the 
FAF only has the following four func-
tions: to provide its views to the Board; 
to review the Board's performance; to 
manage the Board's financial affairs; and 
to perform any other function as the fi-
nance minister may authorise and which 
is published in the Government Gazette.  
 
About six months after the passing of 
the Financial Reporting Act 1997 and 
just before the country began to experi-
ence the impact of the Asian Financial 
Crisis, the NST (11 July 1997) reported 
that both the FAF and MASB com-
menced operations on 1 July 1997.  It 
also said that the finance minister had 
appointed Tan Sri Wan Azmi Wan 
Hamzah, chairman of five KLSE listed 
companies, as the chairman of FAF and 
Raja Datuk Arshad Raja Tun Uda, the 
executive chairman of Price Water-
house, as the chairman of the MASB. 
 
As said earlier, the three new develop-
ments in the accounting arena – Compa-
nies Act’s amendments, MIA’s revival 
and the setting up of the MASB – appear 
to herald a new era for the nation’s ac-
counting arena. The reality could not be 
more further from the truth. This is de-
scribed next. 
 
Debilitating Outcomes of Accounting 
Transformations 
 
During the period of ten years or so prior 
to the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-98, 
the nation’s accounting arena appeared 
to have made progress with amendments 
made to the Companies Act 1965, the 
activation of the MIA and establishment 
of the MASB. But appearance can be 
deceiving as proven by the reality on the 
ground. This can be seen in particular in 
the lack of enforcement of the Compa-
nies Act’s amendments on auditor’s 
ROC reporting duty, MIA’s failure on 
being strong regulator and MASB cre-
ated without the enforcement capability.  
 
The 1985 Amendments to the Compa-
nies Act 1965.  
 
In requiring the auditors to report to the 
ROC in certain cases where there have 
been breaches or non-observance of any 
provisions of the Act is surely an excel-
lent idea – on paper. Previously, the 
auditor could only use the audit report 
and by the time the report is presented to 
the members of the company, the dam-
age caused by the transgressions might 
well have been irreparable.  However, in 
practice, it does not look like a doable – 
even when the law has made it clear that 
auditor who has failed to make such re-
port was liable to spend two years in jail 
and/or pay RM 30,000. As claimed by 
an auditor in an interview, it was not 
practical for auditors to report to the 
ROC when certain situations arose be-
cause the auditors "at the end of the day 
were also businessmen." In most cases, 
he said, the auditors, who were very 
much aware that their positions as audi-
tors were dependent on the support of 
the companies' directors, would be more 
inclined to support the directors rather 
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than take a stand and report matters to 
the ROC.   
 
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising to find 
that the minister of domestic trade and 
consumer affairs had noted to the ac-
countants audience in a seminar that half 
a decade after the amendments were 
passed, the ROC had only received 
“two” reports from the auditors (NST, 29 
Jan. 1991). This he said had taken place 
when his ministry had found numerous 
instances of companies failing to comply 
with statutory and KLSE requirements 
as well as approved accounting stan-
dards in their annual reports (The Malay-
sian Accountant, Feb. 1991, p. 21). The 
following year, he mentioned (NST, 17 
Dec. 1992): “Auditors are still avoiding 
their responsibilities under the law to 
report any breach or non-compliance of 
the Companies Act 1965 to the Registrar 
of Companies." He claimed that if one 
were to consider only the number of re-
ports made by the auditor, one would get 
the wrong impression that Malaysian 
companies were law abiding even 
though the reality showed otherwise. He 
revealed that the RM 7 million fines col-
lected in the first 10 months of 1992 sig-
nalised that far too many companies had 
committed various offences under the 
Act. He also mentioned that in 1991, the 
ROC collected RM 8 million fines from 
7,148 companies. He next stated (The 
Malaysian Accountant, Dec. 1992, p. 
12): "It is therefore apparent that not all 
auditors are performing their duties in 
accordance with law." He warned the 
auditors that "appropriate action" would 
be taken against those who did not carry 
out their duties conscientiously (NST, 17 
Dec. 1992). But with no news reported 
on such action, it may be deduced that 
the auditors concerned need not take the 
warning seriously. This was in fact 
found in several interviews with audi-
tors. 
 
The Activation of the MIA in 1987.  
As noted earlier, based upon docu-
mented sources, it is clear that the MIA 
was made to be active by the govern-
ment for primarily two reasons: to in-
crease the number of indigenous ac-
countants and to clean up the accounting 
profession from “undesirable elements”. 
From those interviewed, a good support 
was found for the former; however, very 
little was mentioned about the latter. The 
interviews had also uncovered many 
other reasons including personal ones 
among those who were said to have ac-
tively sought for the MIA to be revived. 
These reasons included the MIA was 
used as a platform by one or two person-
alities as stepping stones for “better 
things in life” and that it was a vindic-
tive act by certain personalities over 
their unhappiness with the MACPA 
leaders. From the viewpoint of those 
people interviewed who identified these 
“personal” reasons, there was little belief 
that national interests in the form of in-
creasing the number of bumiputra ac-
countants, wiping out unregistered ac-
countants, etc. were really the reasons 
behind the move to activate the MIA. A 
number of them also claimed that that 
the motivation for the MIA to become 
active was really from the accountants at 
the ground level and not the then finance 
minister or other parties in the govern-
ment. With such confusion on MIA’s 
activation, perhaps it was not surprising 
to find that an active MIA had failed to 
deliver on both cases of raising the num-
ber of bumiputra accountants and 
emerging as a strong accounting regula-
tor.  The latter is discussed next.  
 
Accounting Regulator. The fact that 
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since the early 1980s white-collar crime 
in its various forms has proliferated in 
the country is well known (see Koon, 
1994). Related to this, there were revela-
tions made by certain parties in the 
country as to the apparent ill health of 
the local audit practice.  See Central 
Bank (1987, p. 6), Malaysian Business  
(16 Aug. 1988, p. 16) and Choo (1991, 
p. 23). From interviews, it was found 
that numerous parties including a few 
auditors themselves considered that al-
though the last ten years had seen the 
nation’s audit to have actually improved, 
there was still much room for improve-
ment. Two interviewees who were 
closely connected with the MIA had in 
fact stressed that year after year it was 
found that the financial statements se-
lected for reviews uncovered "serious" 
disregard of the approved accounting 
standards and the relevant laws. With all 
this in the background, it is not surpris-
ing to find that certain parties in the 
country had publicly aired their dissatis-
faction on the conduct of members of 
the accounting profession and their rep-
resentative bodies. They also made it 
clear that they would like to see changes 
taking place in the accounting profes-
sion. See remarks made by for example 
the former Governor of the Central Bank 
and the chairman of the bumiputra trust 
agency, Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
(PNB)9 and several listed companies 
Tun Ismail Ali (The Malaysian Account-
ant, July-Sept 1988, p. 18) and those by 
the then finance minister Tun Daim Za-
inuddin in 1989 (Akauntan Nasional, 
Sept. 1989, pp. 21-23) and 1990 
(Akauntan Nasional: Aug. 1990, p. 26 
and Oct. 1990, pp. 20-21)   
Finally, it is notable that the Inland 
Revenue Department (IRD) had in 1988 
voiced its dissatisfaction with the quality 
of work of the nation's public account-
ants and the apparent weaknesses of the 
MIA in fulfilling its regulatory role. A 
letter sent to the MIA president by the 
then deputy director-general of the IRD 
dated 27 July 198810 showed that the 
IRD was not happy with the work exe-
cuted by the MIA members who were 
working as tax accountants. The deputy 
director-general specifically mentioned 
collusion between unqualified account-
ants and qualified accountants and that 
the IRD had also found cases where 
MIA members who acted as tax account-
ants had not done their work properly 
and in some cases had in fact "falsified" 
their clients' accounts for the purpose of 
tax evasion. He also pointed out that the 
MIA president needed to focus on the 
fact that some auditors had failed to con-
duct their audit work in accordance with 
auditing standards. He stressed that the 
MIA president needed to ensure that 
these problems were dealt with or else 
he would not just disclose these matters 
to the public but would also put in place 
"measures" to stop their proliferation. 
Two months after the letter was written, 
The Star (30 Sept. 1988) reported that 
"six reputable accounting firms" with 
bases in Kuala Lumpur were warned by 
the IRD to be more careful when prepar-
ing audited accounts for limited compa-
nies. The then deputy director-general of 
the IRD was reported to say that submit-
ted accounts had contained "gross dis-
crepancies". He also said that the depart-
ment would not be lenient in the coming 
year (1989) with audit firms found re-
sponsible for any discrepancies in au-
dited accounts. The IRD he pointed out 
9The PNB in 1988 had investments in 153 companies 
where 94 of them were quoted at the KLSE (The Ma-
laysian Accountant, July-Sept. 1988, p. 20). 
10It was found as Appendix 8 in the "MIA 1988 
Bounded Document". 
10 It was found as Appendix 8 in the "MIA 1988 
Bounded Document".  
122 A. M. Ali / Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting 1 (2007) 109-148 
 
would take accountants to court for abet-
ting taxpayers to submit incomplete au-
dited accounts. 
 
While it is clear that the MIA needed to 
do a lot to improve the quality of ac-
counting practice in the country, in just 
one word, the MIA's apparent response 
to the proliferation of white-collar crime 
in the country is inadequate. This is es-
pecially the case in the latter few years 
compared to its first two or three years 
after its activation in 1987.  
 
The MIA’s Actions and Inactions. On 
the night before the MIA's first AGM in 
1987, the MIA president mentioned 
what he continued to repeat over the 
next three years:11 The MIA aimed to be 
a strong regulatory body (The Malaysian 
Accountant, Oct-Dec 1987, p. 10).  He 
stressed that after the inaugural AGM 
when MIA was then able to form its in-
vestigation and disciplinary committees, 
the council would have to make "a deter-
mined effort" to clean up the image of 
the profession. The MIA president even 
mentioned that to ensure a more effec-
tive policing by the MIA in the future 
there would be joint investigation and 
disciplinary body comprising representa-
tives from the Treasury, Registrar of 
Companies and Registrar of Coopera-
tives. He had also volunteered to have 
the MIA to take over the "policing" task 
over the auditors handled by "a monitor-
ing committee" in the finance ministry 
that was recently formed and comprised 
of representatives from various bodies 
including the MIA.12 
 
With this apparent early desire to be a 
strong regulator, a few months after the 
MIA first AGM, The Malay Mail (13 
Jan. 1988) reported that following com-
plaints against 15 accountants lodged by 
companies, fellow accountants and gov-
ernment departments, the MIA was go-
ing all out to clean up the act of errant 
accountants. The MIA president was 
reported to have said that 15 accountants 
were under investigation for alleged 
malpractice and criminal breach of trust. 
He also said that the accountants faced 
being de-registered while prosecution in 
court awaits those who had violated the 
Accountants Act 1967.  In the later part 
of 1988 and in early 1989, there were a 
number of reports in the NST on what 
the MIA leaders would do to errant 
members.  The headlines of the news 
reports said all: "MIA May Expel Mem-
bers Who Break the Rules" (21 June 
1988); "MIA Warns Members of Stern 
Action" (15 July 1988); "MIA May Ex-
pel Those Abetting Fraud" (17 Oct. 
1988); "MIA to Haul Up Accountants 
Not Following Rules" (28 Feb. 1989). 
Also on 14 July 1988, in the Business 
Times and The Star the following head-
lines appeared respectively: "Warning 
from the MIA" and "MIA to Get Rid of 
Black Sheep". In the former, the MIA 
president was reported of saying that the 
MIA would not condone members who 
"... persistently refuse to comply with 
11See the MIA 1988 Annual Report (p. 6), 1989 Annual 
Report (p. 7) and Hanifah (1990, p. 15). 
12Information are hard to come by on this committee. 
The only available information found came in the form 
of a few lines appeared in Akauntan Nasional  (Dec. 
1990, p. 24). 
13The apparent exception took place in two occasions: 
one in 1992 when the MIA president was reported to 
say that the MIA had found from its recent investiga-
tion involving 40 accountants that there were auditors 
who had failed to issue proper audit report (NST, 12 
Apr. 1992). And another in 1993 under the headline 
"MIA Warning to Errant Members" (NST, 28 Jan. 
1993). But on closer inspection, the story involved 
members of MIA who colluded with unqualified ac-
countants. Thus, this story was nothing new. It is be-
cause on this subject of collusion between members and 
those people unregistered, the MIA over the years was 
fond of issuing numerous statements to the media mak-
ing one warning after another that stern action would be 
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the statutory requirements, accounting 
and auditing standards adopted by the 
Institute."   
 
But after the MIA's code of ethics was 
made effective in April 1990, hardly 
anything like those stated above had 
come out from the MIA13 When refer-
ence is made to the MIA Annual Reports 
over the years, it is found that since its 
first AGM in September 1987 until the 
AGM in 1996, the MIA's disciplinary 
committees had only taken disciplinary 
actions against members for the years 
1987/88, 1991 and 1992. In other words, 
in the later years after its activation, it 
appears that the MIA has not found it 
"fit" to discipline any members where 
complaints were filed against. For the 
years 1987/88, 1991 and 1992, the MIA 
disciplined four members each year for a 
total of 12 members in its first ten years 
of active life.14  Since 1993 to the AGM 
in 1996, it had failed to take any disci-
plinary actions against members al-
though the MIA Annual Reports showed 
that “every year” since 1987 (except for 
the years 1989 and 1990 when not much 
details were disclosed in the MIA An-
nual Reports on the works done by its 
investigative and disciplinary commit-
tees15) the total number of cases investi-
gated, under review or pending have in 
fact reached 25 (1996), 30 (1995), 25 
(1994), "more than ten" (1993), 29 
(1992), 28 (1991), 39 (1990) and 23 
(1987/88).   
 
With the documented sources showing 
that the MIA's recent performance in 
regulating its members had left much to 
be desired, it should not be surprising to 
hear from an interviewee (who could be 
considered to have close connection 
with the MACPA) that the MIA had 
acted indifferent to the various com-
plaints that he filed with the body. He 
said: "I have filed numerous complaints 
to the MIA on the unethical activities of 
their members.  What did I get?  I did 
not see or hear any actions taken. I did 
not even get a reply to all those letters 
that I sent to them! MIA is really hope-
less in disciplining its members."  All 
this illustrate what Friedland (1989, p. 
74) says to be "the tremendous reluc-
tance" across accounting professional 
bodies in the Far East to prosecute their 
members 
 
As if the MIA’s failure to be effective 
regulator through enforcing existing 
rules and regulations was not bad 
enough, the MIA had made it worse by 
failing to implement “new” ideas that its 
leaders themselves claimed in so many 
instances as crucial in order to 
strengthen the nation's audit practice. 
One of the ideas was concerned with the 
practice of quality review of the audit 
firms. See the MIA 1992 Annual Report 
(p. 7); Mingguan Malaysia (12 Apr. 
1992); Akauntan Nasional (May 1992, 
p. 26; Nov/Dec. 1992, p. 31; June 1993, 
p. 22); NST  (28 July 1992); and, finally 
the MIA 1993 Annual Report (p. 15). 
Another area is concerned with its vari-
taken against its members with really no news whether 
actions had in fact been taken. See The Malay Mail  (4 
Feb. 1988; 26 Feb. 1992) and NST  (17 Sept. 1988; 31 
Jan. 1991). 
14 The MIA in contrast to that of the MACPA did not 
divulge the types of disciplinary action taken against 
the members in its annual reports. Why it did not find it 
fit to clearly spell what these actions were appears to 
be one of those questions whose answers are every-
one's guesses. 
15  The excuse for no disciplinary actions taken in 1989 
was this as appeared in the MIA 1989 Annual Report 
(p. 13): Dato' Shamsir Omar who was sitting in the 
disciplinary committee left the council and thus the 
committee too due to his retirement from his position 
as the then Accountant-General.  As for the year 1990, 
the excuse as found in the MIA 1990 Annual Report (p. 
13) was this: shortage of manpower "especially" with 
the resignation of the Institute's legal officer. 
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ous proposals in 1992 related to the sub-
ject of the auditor's independence which 
the MIA president claimed "ought" to be 
implemented with a few other measures 
to strengthen the profession (see Akaun-
tan Nasional - Conference Times, 15 
July 1992, p. 1; Business Times, 15 July 
1992).  
 
It is also perhaps important to note that 
in at least one case the MIA had ap-
peared to go weak upon its earlier fine 
effort.  This is concerned with the Con-
tinuing Professional Development 
(CPD) that was made effective from 1 
March 1992 (Akauntan Nasional, March 
1992, p. 22).  See the Akauntan Nasional 
(Nov. 1990, p. 20), NST (6 Nov. 1990) 
and Akauntan Nasional  (Nov/Dec 1992, 
pp. 30-31) where the MIA president 
stressed why the MIA needed to have 
the CPD made compulsory.  But the 
MIA 1995 Annual Report (p. 26) dis-
closed that "changes" that were intro-
duced in November 1994 and made ef-
fective from 1 January, 1995 had en-
sured that what took place in the past, 
where the MIA secretariat was the entity 
responsible for CPD record-keeping, 
was replaced with members themselves 
made responsible to do the record-
keeping individually. There is no more 
need now for each member to submit an 
annual CPD report in a prescribed form. 
Instead, members would be selected at 
random and asked to produce evidence 
of compliance. 
 
From interviews conducted with a num-
ber of the MIA council members, they 
were those who readily admitted that the 
MIA was not fit to regulate its members 
because in "Malaysian context" mem-
bers were bound to fail in regulating 
other members. They had however failed 
to give details as what was meant by 
“Malaysian context”. Thus, it is every-
body’s guesses as what exactly they re-
ferred to.  Numerous other reasons were 
also gathered as to why the MIA had not 
acted effectively as a regulator including 
the need for the MIA to protect its mem-
bers from outsiders and the difficulty 
faced by the MIA in searching for the 
evidence of wrong doings. From two 
documented sources other possible rea-
sons were also found. The first source 
was the paper presented by the MIA 
president in 1990 where he mentioned 
the financial constraint faced by the 
MIA in bringing errant members to task 
(Hanifah, 1990, p. 16). The second 
source was the MIA 1994 Annual Re-
port (pp. 6-7) where it was stressed that 
each member of the MIA needed to 
stress on self-discipline.  
 
Finally, it may also be inferred that the 
MIA had been lenient in the later years 
after its activation due to the fact that 
with Tun Daim Zainuddin leaving the 
finance minister post in March 1991 
there had been since then little pressure 
coming from the finance ministry for the 
MIA to show that it could regulate itself 
well. The person who replaced him who 
was also holding the post deputy prime 
minister had not been critical at the per-
formance of the MIA as a regulator. It 
seems that since he took over from Tun 
Daim Zainuddin, only once - in the very 
year when he got hold of the post - that 
he acted critical of the audit executed by 
local auditors. At the 7th National Ac-
countants Conference, he mentioned that 
the government viewed the lack of credi-
bility of the auditors as a serious matter 
since there were among them those who 
had followed the instruction of the com-
pany directors or top management of the 
companies to ensure that the financial 
statements reflected misleading picture 
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of the company affairs (Utusan Malay-
sia, 19 Sept. 1991).  
 
Later on he seems to have a high regard 
in Malaysia's (particularly big?) audit 
firms as shown in the speech he made at 
the MACPA's 36th Annual Dinner (The 
Malaysian Accountant, June 1994, p. 
14): “The accounting fraternity in Ma-
laysia has come a long way since the 
early days of independence … Since 
then, the industry and the country in 
general has grown … Indeed, local ac-
counting firms have gained international 
recognition for their high standards of 
professionalism and expertise, standards 
that are amongst the best in the region.” 
This stance of his contradicted that taken 
a year earlier by the then chairman of a 
body that came under the minister’s ju-
risdiction: the Securities Commission 
(SC). In a hard-hitting lecture on Malay-
sia's corporate governance, he com-
mented on problems in the audit profes-
sion that needed correction.  First, he 
mentioned that he was uncertain whether 
the nation's accounting bodies should be 
self-regulatory in nature (The Malaysian 
Accountant, Oct/Dec 1993, p. 15). Next, 
he pointed out that auditors in the coun-
try had much room for improvement. He 
said that "[t]here have been a number of 
weaknesses in the performance of the 
audit function which I do not propose to 
dwell at length here.”  
 
As if the MIA’s failure to be an effective 
regulator was not bad enough for the 
nation, the MIA right after its activation 
seemed to be spending much of its re-
sources for activities which at the end 
did not seem to have quite benefit any-
one. One was concerned with its func-
tion as “accounting promoter”, and the 
other was its rivalry with the MACPA.  
 
Accounting Promoter.  If as “accounting 
regulator” the MIA had not shown much 
promise, the opposite appears to be the 
case in the promotional field. Indeed, the 
MIA had shown over the years the ten-
dency to give great interest to promote 
the interest of its members in a number 
of ways. Unfortunately, in just about 
every single case, the MIA provided the 
picture that it was living in a world sepa-
rate from the rest of the Malaysian soci-
ety! For example, in just over a year af-
ter it was revived, in October 1988, the 
MIA submitted a memorandum to the 
finance minister requesting the govern-
ment to look into the desirability and 
possible methods of limiting the ac-
countant's personal liability for negli-
gence claims. The government had not 
bothered to respond to this MIA's pro-
posal. As if the government's indiffer-
ence was not embarrassing enough and 
notwithstanding the apparent positive 
state experienced by local auditors 
(where during the first four decades after 
independence there had only been one 
single case where Malaysian auditors 
were brought to court – in 1965; see Az-
ham, 2001b), the MIA had launched in 
1991 a professional indemnity insurance 
scheme for its practising member 
(Akauntan Nasional, July 1992, p. 6). 
Not surprisingly, the MIA had failed to 
get good response from them. After nine 
months, only 10 percent of the some 
800-member firms had signed up (NST, 
30 Sept. 1991). Thus, the MIA president 
said that the MIA council would have to 
consider making it mandatory for all 
member firms to be covered by the 
scheme (NST, 19 Oct. 1991).  
 
Also, the MIA had started early in 1988 
a fight against the unquali-
fied/unregistered accountants. From 
February to November 1988, the MIA 
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resorted to the lodgment of police re-
ports and at times the MIA senior staff 
members would join the police to raid 
the premises of these unqualified ac-
countants. The MIA also hired lawyers 
to bring the matter to court.  By the end 
of 1988, MIA had lodged 92 police re-
ports and the police had raided 19 firms 
(NST, 5 Nov. 1988). The approach taken 
by the MIA received a certain level of 
condemnation from various parties. For 
example, see the Editorial to the Busi-
ness Times (5 March 1988). The crack-
down ended when Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate Secretaries and Administra-
tors (MICSA) representing the unregis-
tered accountants sent a letter of appeal 
to the then finance minister (NST, 5 
Nov. 1988). Later in 1992, the MIA 
launched the Malaysian Association of 
Accounting Technicians (MAAT) to 
house most of these accountants - a 
move that with hindsight did not need 
the MIA to initiate such a crackdown in 
the first place. That was precisely what 
the MIA president claimed in 1989 
(Akauntan Nasional, Sept. 1989, p. 24). 
 
Finally, the MIA in promoting the ac-
counting profession had proposed insti-
tutionalising its minimum audit fees 
schedule (see MIA Council, 1994). The 
new ruling that governed all MIA prac-
tising members was supposed to be ef-
fective from 1 January 1992 (Akauntan 
Nasional, Feb. 1992, p. 19), but it was 
later moved to 1 April 1993 (Akauntan 
Nasional, May 1993, p. 16).  At the end 
it was turned into a mere "guideline" as 
of 1 September 1994. This was because 
as soon as the minimum fee schedule 
was implemented, the uproar began. The 
MIA came to face with severe opposi-
tion from parties such as the Perak Chi-
nese Chamber of Commerce (NST, 17 
Feb. 1993), the Federation of Malaysian 
Manufacturers (FMM) (NST, 18 Feb. 
1994) and the Associated Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Malaysia (ACCCIM) (NST, 11 Feb. 
1994). As a result, in August 1994, the 
MIA president announced that body 
would drop its minimum scale of audit 
fees effective 1 September 1994 and 
instead maintain it as a guide for its 
practising members (NST, 2 Aug. 1994). 
 
Accounting Rivalling. In the interviews 
conducted with both the MACPA and 
MIA leaders, many voiced their unhap-
piness with each other quite forcefully, 
including many revelations by one party 
of the faults of the other and the use of 
critical labels to describe the other. From 
interviews, it seems the rivalry had some 
deep-seated reasons involving among 
others the issue of race (Malay-
controlled MACPA versus Chinese-
controlled MIA), MACPA’s closed-shop 
policy over the years, big versus small 
audit firms and chartered accountants 
versus certified accountants. On the 
other hand, from documents inspected, it 
appeared that the rivalry might be noth-
ing more than competing attempts by 
two interested parties which wanted to 
be the sole leader in the nation’s ac-
counting arena. Yap Leng Kuen (The 
Star, 23 Aug. 1988) argued that the 
MACPA when incorporated in 1958 had 
appeared to consider itself as the de 
facto  leader of the accounting profes-
sion in the country. The proof that that 
was the case may be found in several 
documented sources penned by those 
who were leaders of the MACPA (see 
Nawawi, 1979, p. 5; Abu-Hassan, 1986, 
p. 3). Also, check out the following re-
vealing remark coming from the 
MACPA 1985 Annual Report (pp. 13-
16): "A Public Affairs Committee was 
formed immediately after the last AGM 
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to take charge of the PR aspects of the 
Association's activities. The Committee 
has developed a scheme, to be launched 
in stages, to increase public awareness 
of the accountancy profession and to 
position the Association as the leader in 
the profession." (Emphasis added.)  But 
now after thirty long years with the MIA 
revival in 1987 as the statutory body to 
oversee the development in the profes-
sion, the MACPA leaders had suddenly 
found their association placed in a sec-
ondary role. This was a fact that the as-
sociation leaders resented very much 
and which they would do their best to 
put aside. The “MIA 1988 Bounded 
Document" (pp. 44-46) provided a vivid 
picture of the MIA-MACPA rivalry. 
Early on it said that the MIA's problem 
with the MACPA was the result of dis-
satisfaction among a section of MACPA 
candidates who were defeated in their 
attempt to sit at the MIA council at the 
first MIA's AGM in September 1987.16 
It also said that their defeat had resulted 
in them using all the power and influ-
ences to obstruct the MIA council from 
fulfilling the objectives of the MIA as 
stated in the Accountants Act 1967.  
Next, it pointed out that this group had 
suggested to the government to return 
the MIA back to its position before the 
activation as the registration body.  In 
another publication, Berita  MIA 
(January 1988, p. 12), the MIA disclosed 
that following the MIA’s inaugural 
AGM, the MIA council set up their own 
secretariat which previously was shared 
with that of the MACPA. When the 
MACPA council was informed that that 
was the case, the MACPA president and 
his fellow council members became 
“quite upset” and had two days later 
called off the joint committee arrange-
ment that the MACPA had with the 
MIA.17 
 
It was a few months later - in April 1988 
– that the general public first came to 
know about the problems between the 
leaders of the accounting bodies. The 
MIA president went to the media men-
tioning that a group of people consisting 
of "officials of a smaller accounting 
body" were "out to do mischief" (NST, 
22 Apr. 1988). He also said that these 
mischief makers "... are quite big. They 
have vested interests because they feel 
they are not represented in the council." 
These people he claimed were collecting 
proxies to vote against the MIA pro-
posed changes to be tabled at an EGM. 
A few days later he said that the "rival 
accounting group" did not want to see 
the MIA playing a greater role (The Ma-
lay Mail, 25 Apr. 1988). In many of the 
newspapers reports, the MACPA was 
not identified, though in the Utusan Ma-
laysia (30 Apr. 1988) it was reported 
16  In total, nine CACA members compared to four 
from the MACPA were elected to sit in the MIA's 
fifteen-person council (Business Times, 21 Sept. 1987). 
CACA was able to win many seats not just because it 
had a large group of members but also because its 
members were better organised for the election than 
those of other MIA's recognised accounting bodies 
whose members also aimed to have "majority control" 
in the MIA council (Business Times, 21 Sept. 1987). In 
1988, the CACA had more members (1,800) and stu-
dents (about 6,000) in Malaysia than in any other coun-
try - except for Hong Kong (Business Times, 2 March 
1988).  Internationally, the association had then 30,000 
members with over 10,000 were based outside the UK 
and more than 70,000 students. In 1995, the CACA in 
Malaysia had 12,000 registered students and about 
2,000 members (Business Times, 22 May 1995). 
17  It was a few months prior to the MIA’s inaugural 
AGM that both the MIA and the MACPA agreed to 
have the cooperation between the two bodies enhanced 
through the joint cooperation of most of the commit-
tees of the two bodies (see The Malaysian Accountant, 
July 1987, p. 3). For more on what transpired related to 
the topic of the disband of the joint committee arrange-
ment, see the letter sent by the MIA president dated 5 
October, 1987 and the reply by the then MACPA presi-
dent, Subimal Sen Gupta dated 30 October, 1987 that 
are placed as Appendices 1 and 2, respectively, in the 
"MIA 1988 Bounded Document". 
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that the culprits came from a profes-
sional accounting body which had been 
successful in influencing several large 
accounting firms to support their actions. 
In the "MIA 1988 Bounded Document" 
(pp. 41-42), it was stated specifically 
that the body was the MACPA. Looking 
at what transpired during the EGM, 
there was no doubt that it was those 
from the MACPA who were the “trouble 
makers”. As noted Yap Leng Kuen (The 
Star, 23 Aug. 1988), some MACPA 
members objected to various proposals 
to amend the Accountant Rules 1972. 
Four MACPA members consistently 
asked for polls, despite a clear cut ma-
jority by a show of hands and the fact 
that they knew they would be defeated 
every time. 
 
 This April 1988 EGM rivalry episode 
led to other distressing episodes of rival-
ry18 and what appeared at the end to 
have resulted with the establishment of 
the MASB in mid-1997 to great disap-
pointment on the part of the MIA but 
much satisfaction for those leading the 
MACPA.  While documents analysed 
have failed to provide clear cut evidence 
of the MACPA’s direct involvement in 
the setting up of the MASB,19 the inter-
views conducted with a number of lead-
ers of the MIA provide the evidence that 
that was indeed the case. Their explana-
18   Two more episodes took place in 1988.  The one in 
July concerned the various proposals by the then 
MACPA president to the MIA including the forming 
of an "accounting standards consultative committee" 
to develop and issue accounting standards and audit-
ing guidelines (NST, 23 July 1988). A council member 
of the MIA had in response accused the MACPA of 
"usurping the statutory powers of the MIA". See also 
The Malaysian Accountant  (July-Sept 1988, p. 15), 
NST  (26 July 1988) and (27 July 1988). Another one 
took place at the end of 1988 (NST, 8 and 17 Dec. 
1988).  This and the one taking place at the end of 
1993 (NST, 9 and 18 Dec. 1993; The Star, 8 and 15 
Dec. 1993) concerned the opposing groups of mem-
bers coming from the MACPA and the CACA who 
strived to have their colleagues to fill the six seats in 
the MIA council.  In the case of the 1988 election, 
both parties had mentioned to the media that they 
aimed to control the MIA council because that would 
give them a better opportunity to look after their inter-
ests (The Star, 16 Nov. and 8 Dec. 1988). As for the 
1993 election, the rivalry appeared to be more serious 
where members of the MIA were personally ap-
proached to secure their vote and proxy votes were 
collected from those unable to attend (NST, 18 Dec. 
1993). Sarcastic remarks were also thrown by one to 
the other in the written media. See the NST  (9 Dec. 
1993, 15 Dec. 1993) and The Star (8 Dec. 1993, 15 
Dec. 1993). Besides these episodes, one more took 
place in 1992 with the involvement of a third party the 
ROC. It concerned Companies Amendment Act 1992 
where its Section 132A had included the MACPA 
together with the MIA and Malaysian Association of 
the Institute Chartered Secretaries and Administrators 
(MAICSA) as the three bodies whose members were 
recognised to be among those who were automatically 
qualified to act as companies' secretaries and who thus 
needed not to be given licenses by the ROC (Business 
Times, 11 Feb. 1993). See also Business Times  (13 
Feb. 1992). Also in 1992, another episode of rivalry 
began which only came to an end in 1994. This rivalry 
revolved upon the use of statutory designations. See 
Akauntan Nasional (Feb. 1992, p. 20), (Aug. 1992, p. 
26) and The Malaysian Accountant  (Feb. 1992, p. 15). 
From an interview with two MIA council members, 
they mentioned that it was only due to the involvement 
of the finance ministry in this episode that stopped the 
two accounting bodies from having their differences 
settled by the court. 
19  However, there certainly exist a number of “indirect” 
written evidence that that is the case. See remarks 
stated in the MACPA 1995 Annual Report  (p. 38) and 
those uttered in a speech by the then MACPA president 
in the following year (The Malaysian Accountant, June/
Aug 1996, p. 17). The latter was very clear on the sup-
port given towards the government’s move in setting up 
MASB. Also note that there exist at least two docu-
mented sources which were published in the previous 
decade showing the picture that the MACPA leaders 
were for years had hoped for such a body to emerge: 
Gupta (1987) and Peng (1987, p. 12). Finally, it was in 
1988 when the then MACPA president gave a press 
briefing on the formation of an “accounting standards 
consultative committee” which had caused much con-
sternation in the MIA council (NST, 23 July 1988). 
Discussed earlier as one of MIA-MACPA rivalry epi-
sodes, the then MACPA president without discussing 
the matter beforehand with the MIA leaders stated that 
the MACPA would initiate the formation of such entity 
to develop and issue accounting standards and auditing 
practices in Malaysia. The committee would have rep-
resentations from the MACPA, the MIA, the universi-
ties and the relevant regulatory authorities. All in all, it 
is difficult to believe that the MACPA was on the side-
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tions were in fact substantiated by those 
coming from two leaders of the 
MACPA. One of these two had even 
gone on record to say that the MACPA 
saw the MASB as a 'counterweight' to 
the MIA. He had also pointed out: “With 
the MASB, the MACPA has very clev-
erly cut the MIA's power by half!”   
 
Further evidence, albeit indirect, of the 
MACPA’s involvement came in the 
form of those appointed as the heads of 
MASB and FAF.  For the MASB, the 
person mentioned earlier was also a for-
mer president of the MASB; while for 
the FAF, this person was also a former 
member of the MACPA’s council. It is 
worth noting that all the big six audit 
firms which were influential in MACPA 
were represented in either FAF or 
MASB or both: one in both the MASB 
and FAF through Raja Datuk Arshad, 
another four in FAF and the last one in 
MASB. As for the MIA, it was only the 
president represented in the MASB!   
 
The Setting up of the MASB in mid-
1997. The renowned lawyer G. Sri Ram 
gave the following appalling picture of a 
segment of the Malaysian corporate sec-
tor (Ram, 1985, p. 1):  
 
[These public companies were] ... run 
like a family business with none to 
question and none to answer ... Even 
family companies, seeking to reap 
huge profits, turn public.  Shares are 
listed in the stock exchange. Yet 
some of these organisations find 
great difficulty in abandoning the 
concept of unquestioned manage-
ment. Many directors consequently 
do not familiarise themselves with 
basic company law. They flout, 
sometimes quite arrogantly, estab-
lished principles of corporate law.  
They shun the advice of profession-
als.  They forget that they are no 
longer running a family company, 
that they are answerable to the law ... 
 
Ten years after he made this remark, the 
situation had yet to improve. That is, 
although since 1994, the number of new 
companies registered yearly in the coun-
try was roughly 40,000 (NST, 23 Apr. 
1997) to lead to a total of more than 
404,000 companies by the third quarter 
of 1996 (Business Times, 18 Sept. 1996) 
and that the number of companies listed 
at the KLSE had also grown by over 200 
during the same time period, between 
January and August 1996, a total of over 
30,000 fines valued at nearly RM 8 mil-
lion were issued to errant companies by 
the ROC (Business Times, 18 Sept. 
1996). About 70 percent of this amount 
was due to failure or delay in the tabling 
of their accounts at AGMs and sending 
in their annual returns and other docu-
ments to the ROC. This appears to be 
the basic story year after year ever since 
1988 when the ROC started to be strict 
in imposing fines on companies (The 
Sunday Mail, 21 Aug. 1988)20. Thus, it 
is not an exaggeration to say that many 
Malaysian companies have found little 
hesitation to flout the law.   
 
Unfortunately, that is not their only 
crime, for they are also famous for being 
reluctant to disclose much. See the re-
20    Thus, for example, in 1988 total fines of nearly RM 
5.5 million were collected. In 1989, it was over RM 4 
million - a reduction in amount compared to the previ-
ous year due to the temporary lowering of the com-
pound rate (Shaari, 1990, p. 13). Two years later, in 
1991, the ROC collected RM 8 million fines from 
7,148 companies (The Malaysian Accountant, Dec. 
1992, p. 12). The following year, in 1992, the ROC 
collected RM 7.39 million in penalties from 24,241 
convicted companies (NST, 19 Feb. 1993). Finally, in 
1993, it was reported that a total of 67,000 companies 
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marks made by Dr. Barjoyai Bardai in 
his newspaper column (Berita Minggu, 
25 July 1993) and those in 1995 by the 
then minister of domestic trade and con-
sumer (The Malaysian Accountant, Dec. 
1995, p. 17). See also the interesting 
speech made by Tan Sri Datuk Jaafar 
Hussein when he was the Central Bank 
Governor where he mentioned the lack 
of disclosures “and” the reasons for such 
phenomenon (Jaafar, 1992). Besides 
these anecdotal accounts, an empirical 
study by Tong et al. (1989) and another 
by Tong and Ann (1996), both on volun-
tary disclosures, found a high level of 
non-disclosure by samples of companies 
listed at the KLSE. As if the tendencies 
to flout the law and the reluctance to 
provide sufficient disclosures are not 
bad enough, Malaysian companies are 
not averse in treating their minority 
shareholders with a certain level of in-
difference or even contempt. This was 
vividly described by the then minister of 
domestic trade and consumer affairs in 
mid-1990s (The Malaysian Accountant, 
Feb. 1995, p. 13):     
 
... companies should not practice 
double standards in distributing their 
annual reports.  Although it is appre-
ciated that a company would want to 
impress financial institutions, credi-
tors, fund managers and prominent 
businessmen by issuing them well 
laid-out, coloured copies of their an-
nual reports, [minority] shareholders 
should not be given second-class 
treatment and be merely served poor 
quality black and white copies of the 
annual reports minus valuable infor-
mation.  In some cases, copies of an-
nual reports sent to shareholders con-
tain only the bare minimum disclo-
sure stipulated by the law … 
 
With all this in the background, it may 
be deduced that nothing much may thus 
be expected from corporate bigwigs and 
their auditors in ensuring that compa-
nies’ financial reports abide to the re-
quirement of full disclosure. And yet the 
Financial Reporting Act 1997 Act 
(which has made it clear that MASB 
accounting standards are compulsory for 
any published accounts of a business 
entity in Malaysia and its overseas sub-
sidiary or associated companies whose 
accounts form the consolidated accounts 
in Malaysia) does not make any direct 
statement on the enforcement activity of 
the MASB or other related bodies.   
 
This is unexpected considering that early 
on in 1994, when the then finance minis-
ter first raised the subject of an 
“independent” body to develop account-
ing standards, he mentioned that “…the 
time has come for us to consider the es-
tablishment of an Accounting Standards 
Board backed by a body which can en-
sure stronger arrangements for securing 
compliance …” (The Malaysian Ac-
countant, June 1994, pp. 14-15). In the 
following year, during the 1996 Budget 
Speech he used the terms "enforcement" 
and "monitoring" when talking about the 
MASB (NST, 28 Oct. 1995). But just 
before the Parliament passed the bill on 
the establishment of the MASB, he 
could only say that the FRF and MASB 
would be supplemented by appropriate 
compliance and enforcement mecha-
nisms of the ROC, Central Bank and SC 
(Business Times, 8 Oct. 1996). Unfortu-
nately, he did not go into detail how 
were convicted by the domestic trade and consumer 
affairs ministry (Business Times, 30 July 1993). And 
just like in 1992 and earlier years, the majority of these 
convictions were derived from failures to convene 
AGMs or present the financial statements to members. 
The ministry had imposed fines between RM 200 to 
RM 2,000 on each offender, while 126 companies' 
directors had been charged in court for serious offences. 
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these bodies would go about ensuring 
corporate compliance. With the ROC 
having little expertise in accounting and 
auditing,21 nothing much has been heard 
on the Central Bank’s enforcement ac-
tivity22 and the fact that to date the SC 
has hardly shown any interest in compa-
nies' financial reporting,23 it is uncertain 
as to how far these regulators will be 
effective in their enforcement activities.   
 
Therefore, it may not be an exaggeration 
to say that with or without the MASB, 
the future state of financial reporting - 
assuming little intervention from the 
“Asian Financial Crisis” - would con-
tinue much as it was when the MACPA 
(with its limited power) and later the 
MIA controlled regulation of practice. It 
could not be expected to be that much 
different from its past even though the 
Act has ensured that the finance minister 
retains considerable authority over the 
practice of financial reporting in the 
country: Section 15 notes that the minis-
ter's directions to the Foundation and the 
Board in regard to their respective func-
tions and authorities need to be 
"listened" to and that both the FAF and 
MASB will have to report their activities 
to him when they are required to do so 
"from time to time". Also, its final sec-
tion, Section 29, notes that "[t]he Minis-
ter may make such regulations as may 
be expedient or necessary for carrying 
out or giving effect to the provisions of 
this Act."  
 
In fact, such provisions could very well 
make things worse for the fact that per-
sons who hold the finance minister post 
may be biased in their decisions for the 
good of businesses which they are in-
volved either directly or indirectly 
through their associates. In the country, 
politicians and their political parties 
which form the governing party are 
known to be heavily involved in busi-
nesses. In other words, what could very 
well be an instrument for the good of the 
country as a whole, the MASB may turn 
out to be an instrument beneficial for 
only a certain segment of the population.  
 
Already it was disheartening to find that 
many of those who were influential in 
the MACPA had got seats in the MASB 
and/or its parent body the FAF – to the 
exclusion of many other parties who 
constituted the accounting sector in the 
country. For at least one of them, his 
appointment was a source of surprise for 
the fact that (about a year prior to his 
appointment) he in a speech had de-
graded the need for accounting standards 
and the function supposedly played out 
by the external auditors in the country 
(The Malaysian Accountant, Oct/Dec 
1996, p. 20). This person who was ap-
pointed as the chairman of FAF had said 
the following when giving his view over 
the controversial issue of reporting for 
goodwill (pp. 21-22): 
 
While the professions labours in-
tensely over issues of how to stan-
dardise the writing down of goodwill 
and such other items of extreme ac-
counting delicacy, the investing pub-
lic is quite content to value a Malay-
21   This appeared to be the accepted view by more than 
a few who were interviewed.   
22   Exception perhaps may be found in the small publi-
cation made available to the public in 1987! See Central 
Bank (1987). 
23   It was none other than Tan Sri Dato' Dr. Jaafar Hus-
sein the former Central Bank Governor who mentioned 
in an interview that the SEC in the US had got a person 
known as the SEC Accountant charged with the task of 
overseeing the reliability of financial statements filed 
by corporations and who was given the power to take 
actions against errant auditors and/or their accounting 
firms. In his view, the SC in Malaysia could very well 
also be playing the same function. The fact that the SC 
so far had failed to do so had caused him much disap-
pointment.    
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sian Second Board company [at the 
KLSE] which may not have any spe-
cial license, technology or brand 
name, at twenty times book. Reminds 
you of that time when whole commu-
nities of European clergy closeted 
themselves and debated intensely 
over the sex of Angels while that 
continent labours under the Dark 
Ages. What does it all mean? I sus-
pect it may mean that the investor, 
that mythical shareholders that all 
auditors address their reports to, 
doesn't give two hoots about audit 
reports and accounting standards. 
That the mythical shareholder actu-
ally knows the severe limitations and 
relevance that accounts prepared on 
lines of historical conventions have 
as instruments of shareholder infor-
mation or protection. And that very 
notion of statutory audits as encapsu-
lated in company legislation in Ma-
laysia and other jurisdictions are lost 
cause propositions.  
 
This damaging opinion coming from a 
personality who was considered as one 
of the leaders of the Malaysian account-
ing profession was reinforced as follows 
(p. 22):  
 
Perhaps the profession should find 
the great moment to finally own up 
and tell government and legislators 
and regulators that the notion of ex-
ternal audits for investor protection is 
over-rated, overly expensive and 
quite futile. And if indeed share-
holder protection is the objective, that 
it would be cheaper to bring back the 
iron-maiden and other such delicate 
forms of medieval persuasions than 
to rely on our audit side. 
 
Changes taking place in the accounting 
arena in the post-NEP era had not seen 
to lead to successful outcomes. In regard 
to the Companies Act’s 1985 amend-
ments, this concerned the expansion of 
the auditor’s reporting responsibility. As 
for the revived MIA, one of the areas 
which it was supposed to work on and 
which it had failed to show any signifi-
cant results was its regulatory responsi-
bility. Finally, when it concerned the 
MASB, the focus is on its lack of power 
in enforcing the accounting standards 
issued. By applying the political econ-
omy of accounting theory, the following 
section attempts to explain the reasons 
for the phenomenon of “the triumph of 
hope over experience” of these account-





Following the occurrence of racial vio-
lence in May 1969 in Kuala Lumpur, the 
government launched the New Eco-
nomic Policy (NEP) in 1971 with the 
purported aimed of fair distribution of 
economic benefits among members of 
society. This had in turn led the govern-
ment to emphasise its “direct” participa-
tion in the nation's economy "on behalf" 
of the Malays and other bumiputras 
(Azham, 2001b). As a result, from early 
1970s onward, there was the strong pres-
ence of the government in the corporate 
sector. As for the Chinese, by late 1970s 
the ownership structure of their busi-
nesses had begun to evolve from major-
ity sole proprietorships and partnerships 
to corporations – in an attempt to com-
pete with the government companies.   
 
The strong presence of the government 
and the increasing involvement of local 
Chinese in the corporate sector appeared 
to signify that those who owned, man-
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aged and funded the corporations in the 
country came from two separate groups 
of people – each group had its own 
shared goals that were not only eco-
nomic but also social and political. 
There was perhaps a mass base of indi-
vidual investors and the financial sup-
port from banks in each case. However, 
these people and those banks to a very 
large extent possessed the same social, 
economic and political aspirations as 
those managing the companies. The en-
terprises were registered as companies 
but in actuality they were unlike those 
known as companies in the western 
sense of the word "company" with con-
flicting interests of different parties. 
Nonetheless, in the 1970s as also before, 
Malaysia's industrial growth was heavily 
dependent on foreign capital. As a result, 
in the manufacturing sector in particular, 
foreigners invested substantially in ac-
cord with the government's encourage-
ment and the various incentives offered. 
 
With such to be the case, perhaps it 
could be expected that to a large extent 
the nation’s accounting landscape then 
was transformed into a no-man’s land 
(Azham, 2001b). The Companies Act 
1965 and Accountants Act 1967 that 
earlier were aimed to facilitate the emer-
gence of free enterprise economy were 
mainly left unapplied until two decades 
later. The government acted as if ac-
counting and accountants of being little 
relevant leading to the statutory account-
ing body MIA lying low while the pri-
vately established MACPA catering to 
the needs of foreign investors was al-
lowed to be active in quite a taxing man-
ner. In short, the nation’s accounting 
then was very much in a quagmire. 
Later, in the second half of 1980s, 
change finally began to take place in the 
nation’s economy and in turn in the ac-
counting sector. What seemed to have 
pushed for changes to take place was the 
occurrence of two economic recessions 
taking place in the first six years of the 
1980s (see Ismail, 1994; Yan, 1994; Za-
inal-Aznam, 1994; and Mohd.-Saufi, 
1986). The first recession was mild and 
took place in 1981-82 when the rest of 
the world also experienced recession. 
The second recession that occurred in 
1985-86 was the worse that the nation 
had experienced to that date. 
 
The recessions had apparently shocked 
the government and jolted it into intro-
ducing a number of new policy meas-
ures. For example, the Fifth Malaysian 
Plan (1986-1990) emphasised public 
sector consolidation, rationalisation and 
completion of ongoing projects. It re-
nounced new major public sector initia-
tives and instead placed greater empha-
sis on the private sector, calling for the 
privatisation of a number of govern-
ment-held companies. Significantly, at 
the wake of the 1985-86 economic re-
cession, the government had intensified 
its efforts to attract foreign investors to 
the country's manufacturing sector. 
Guidelines on foreign equity participa-
tion were liberalised in 1986 along with 
access to credit markets, foreign ex-
change controls and the ability of for-
eign firms to acquire lands.24 Thus, the 
NEP had to some extent come to an end 
around this time and not in 1990 as 
planned in the early 1970s.  
 
Meanwhile, various new developments 
also took place during this period in the 
24It appears that these efforts had produced the desir-
able outcomes! While the net inflow of FDI into Ma-
laysia averaged RM 200-RM 300 million annually 
from the 1960s to the early 1970s and hovered around 
RM 1 billion annually during the period 1974-79 be-
fore rising to a record level of RM 3.3 billion in 1982, 
since 1987 the amount of FDI has shot up tremen-
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manner the securities were traded and 
the parties involved in the trading. A 
number of these developments were ini-
tiated by the then finance minister and 
others by the KLSE itself.25 Not surpris-
ingly, by late 1980, the Malaysian stock 
market had grown by leaps and bound.26 
Besides new developments taking place 
in the securities market, changes had 
also finally taken place in the business 
regulatory arena in regard to two gov-
ernment agencies: the Registrar of Com-
panies (ROC)27 and the Inland Revenue 
Department (IRD).28 
 
It was within this national context that 
two new developments took place in the 
accounting arena: the amendments made 
to the Companies Act 1965 in 1985 and 
dously: it was RM 1.1 billion in 1987, RM 1.9 billion 
in 1988, RM 6.8 billion in 1990 and RM 9.5 billion in 
1991 (Yan, 1994, p. 569). In particular, private invest-
ment in the manufacturing sector grew at an average 
rate of 50 percent per year between 1987 and 1990. 
There was a three fold increase in three years of invest-
ment in the manufacturing sector with approved pro-
jects totalling RM 9.1 billion in 1988 increasing to RM 
28.1 billion in 1990. Over the 1980-88 period, manu-
facturing goods' share of the nation's total exports grew 
from 22 percent to 49 percent. In 1990, the export of 
manufactures accounted for 60.4 percent of total ex-
ports while the export of agricultural commodities 
accounted for only 10 percent (Anuwar, 1994, p. 710). 
25   The new developments included the followings: the 
corporatisation of the stockbroking members of the 
KLSE, the installation of real-time price reporting 
system for brokers (MASA), the forming of Advance 
Warning and Surveillance Unit (AWAS), the launching 
of the Second Board, the introduction of semi-
automated trading system called System on Computer-
ised Order Routing and Execution (SCORE) to replace 
that of the open-outcry, the implementation of Fixed 
Delivery and Settlement System (FDSS) to make clear-
ing and settlement more efficient, the raising to RM 20 
million as the minimum capital requirements for all 
stockbroking companies, the issuance of new listing 
manual containing a new section of corporate disclo-
sure policies and penalties, the delisting of all Malay-
sian companies from the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
and last but certainly not the least the granting of per-
mission for the listing of property trust, warrants and 
TSR in the KLSE.  
26   From 1980 to 1989, the 250 companies listed in 
1980 increased to 307 in 1989, and the nominal value 
and market capitalisation grew to RM 34.3 billion and 
RM 156.1 billion, respectively (Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange and Malaysian Strategic Consultancy Sdn. 
Bhd., 1992, pp. 28-29). Also, the volume of transac-
tions rose from 1.5 billion units in 1980 to 10.2 billion 
units in 1989, while value increased from RM 5.6 
billion to RM 18.5 billion in 1989. By the end of 1989, 
a record RM 10.7 billion had been raised from the 
market, the largest amount coming from rights issues, 
at RM 6.1 billion. 
27   In 1987, only about 50,000 companies out of 
150,000 companies regularly filed an annual return 
with the ROC (Peng, 1987, p. 7). From 1988 onward, 
the ROC began to be strict in imposing fines on com-
 
panies (The Sunday Mail, 21 Aug. 1988). Thus, in July 
and August 1988, only 43 out of almost 6,000 applica-
tions for extensions of the presentation of accounts to 
shareholders at the AGM were approved. In 1988, as 
mentioned above, total fines of nearly RM 5.5 million 
were collected. It appeared that as late as 1987, compa-
nies which submitted accounts late were not fined while 
appeals for extensions to submit accounts or to hold 
AGMs were usually granted. This was because the 
ROC had only two choices: either to approve the exten-
sion of time or to take the responsible party to court 
(Akauntan Nasional, Oct. 1988, p. 16). In the NST  (20 
Aug. 1988), the then trade and industry minister said 
that the latter was not executed for it involved a lot of 
work. However, with the amendments to the Compa-
nies Act 1965 which came into effect on 1 February 
1987, the Registrar had now been empowered to im-
pose compound fines on those who failed to table their 
accounts at the company's AGM within six months of 
the balance sheet date.  
28    Like the ROC, the IRD also appears to come fully to 
life during this time period. Berita Harian  (31 Aug. 
1988) revealed that the IRD had failed to collect taxes 
from 500,000 private limited companies and sole pro-
prietorship due to their inability of presenting appropri-
ate financial statements.  From 1989-onward however 
the IRD would make it compulsory for these businesses 
to send out the complete financial statements. The IRD 
would implement for the "first time" Sections 82 and 
114 of the Income Tax Act 1967 in 1989 (NST, 25 Sept. 
1988). The following month, in a related and an inter-
esting report published by the Akauntan Nasional (Oct. 
1988, p. 19), it was mentioned that with the enforce-
ment of Sections 82 and 114 of the Income Tax Act 
1967 in 1989, any businessmen who failed to provide 
true and complete records of accounting would incur 
penalties that could go up to RM 10,000 or three years 
in prison or both. In addition, accountants who assisted 
their clients to falsify the accounting records would 
face the same consequence. The director-general of 
IRD had also issued in 1988 an "Advance Notice for 
Submission of Income Tax Returns for Year Assess-
ment 1989" where it was stated that for all accounts 
prepared they needed to be accompanied by confirma-
tion letters from qualified accountants and tax agents 
(The Star, 21 Jan. 1989). Such demand ensured that the 
unregistered accountants would fail to fulfil it. 
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the activation of the statutory accounting 
body MIA with its very first AGM in 
September 1987. And after several years 
of polemic, the government made the 
move to set up the MASB in mid-1997. 
This action took place at a time when the 
sophistication of the stock market had 
appeared not just in terms of greater 
amount of money invested or the num-
ber of people involved, but also in the 
legal infrastructure.29   
 
Unfortunately, the implementation of the 
amended Companies Act on external 
auditor’s ROC reporting duty had left 
much to be desired for. At the most, the 
authorities were only capable of giving 
warnings to the auditors to get their acts 
together. As for the MASB, its responsi-
bility to issue accounting standards was 
not equipped with the right mechanism 
to ensure companies’ conformance.  
 
The failure of the authorities to do what 
was appropriate in the two cases involv-
ing Companies Act 1965 and the MASB 
was however paled in comparison to 
their half-hearted conduct in ensuring 
the MIA was fulfilling its function as a 
regulatory body. That is, while the ac-
tions of MIA in the regulatory field were 
below expectations, the accountants and 
their representative body the MIA were 
largely left undisturbed. In most cases, 
there were merely told to do better or at 
best were given warnings by authorities 
to improve. It was as if the appeals and 
warnings were sufficient to force the 
accountants and the MIA to get their act 
together. In short, there was much rheto-
ric but nothing else. The half-hearted 
reaction to the MIA's self-regulatory 
failure in particular and the quagmire in 
the profession in general may be found 
in speeches delivered by for example the 
then deputy finance minister Loke Yuen 
Yow in July 1988 (which may be found 
as Appendix 12 in the "MIA 1988 
Bounded Document") and later in 1990 
(Akauntan Nasional, Oct. 1990, p. 21) 
and also in the speech by the then fi-
nance minister himself in September 
1989 (Akauntan Nasional, Sept. 1989, 
pp. 21-23).  
 
In understanding the failure on the part 
of the power-to-be to enforce auditor’s 
ROC reporting duty under the 1985 
amendments of the Companies Act, to 
ensure MIA played the role of strong 
regulator and finally later in 1997 to 
have the MASB equipped with the 
power to enforce its accounting stan-
dards, the theory of political economy of 
accounting appears handy. Specifically, 
the accounting transformation lacking 
substance may be explained by the fact 
that the accounting system existed in an 
environment where the economy was to 
29   In regard to the former, for example, in 1993, the 
daily trading averaged of the KLSE numbered to 800 
million shares compared to around 3 million shares 
two decades earlier (NST, 21 May 1993). At the end of 
1993, the market value of the KLSE rose to RM 620 
billion - an increase of 152 percent from the RM 246 
billion recorded at the end of the previous year (NST, 
14 May 1994). In 1993 too, the total volume and turn-
over rose to 108 billion units valued at RM 387 billion, 
which exceeded the combined volume and turnover for 
the past 20 years. In 1994, the International Finance 
Corporation, an affiliate of the World Bank, posted in 
the Internet that the KLSE's market capitalisation as at 
November 1993 was US$175 billions - the second 
biggest after Hong Kong among 22 emerging markets 
capitalisation. As for the legal infrastructure of the 
KLSE, it was in 1993 too that the KLSE listing re-
quirements was amended to stipulate that companies 
seeking listing must establish an audit committee. 
Existing listed companies had to set-up such a commit-
tee by 1 August 1994 (Akauntan Nasional,  Nov/Dec. 
1993, p. 26). It was later extended to 1 October 1994  
(NST,  2 Sept. 1994). The following year, the penalties 
for any breach of the KLSE listing requirements, 
which included non-disclosure of corporate informa-
tion, were upgraded from public reprimands and sus-
pension of trading to fines of up to RM 100,000 (NST, 
30 Sept. 1994). Finally, as mentioned earlier, it was in 
1993 also that the Securities Commission (SC) was 
established. 
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a large extent in the hands of the few 
who were also deeply involved in the 
nation’s politics.  
 
Elite in Malaysia. As a whole, the sig-
nificant power held by the elite in the 
nation’s economy, in particular the cor-
porate sector, is not that hard to deci-
pher. During the NEP era, in a study by 
Ling (1977) of the top 98 manufacturing 
companies in Malaysia in 1974-75, it is 
found that “one” percent of the over 
100,000 shareholders accounted for al-
most 80 percent of the shares held, 
worth a total of about RM 1.2 billion 
(see also Ling, 1982).  Also, Hui (1981) 
in his study of share ownership of one 
hundred largest companies in Malaysia, 
1974-76, reveals that it was highly con-
centrated in the hands of a few institu-
tions. The share ownership of these in-
stitutions was in turn concentrated in the 
hands of a few individuals and families 
through interlocking directorates. He 
concludes that the Berle and Means 
(1931) thesis of management control 
rather than ownership control could not 
be applied to Malaysia without strong 
corrective and empirical analysis.  
 
A decade later, the situation remained 
the same. Chandra (1989, p. 84) notes 
that in 1983 a large proportion of the top 
797 stock-owners were Chinese and one 
percent of them accounted for 32.23 per-
cent of the value of shares whereas the 
bottom 50 percent accounted for only 
1.92 percent (see also Hui, 1983 and 
Mehmet, 1986, Chapter Five). In the late 
1980s, after many facets of the NEP 
were amended, a study done by the 
KLSE also found similar results: 87.5 
percent of the paid up capital of 225 Ma-
laysian incorporated companies as at 31 
December, 1987 was held by 8.1 percent 
of shareholders who held more than 
10,000 shares each (Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange, 1988, p. 22). Based on 
the same data, Salleh (1989, p. 4) stated 
that on average, 75 percent of the equity 
of each company were normally held by 
the 20 largest shareholders.  
 
In the 1990s, no study had apparently 
been conducted to find out the extent of 
the elite’s share ownership. Nonetheless, 
it is well noted that the local corporate 
scene is filled with individuals or com-
panies owning at least 51 percent of the 
shares of the so-called public companies 
- including those listed at the KLSE. The 
NST (30 May 1994) reported that more 
than two-thirds of the 335 companies on 
the main board and all of the 92 on the 
second board were controlled either by 
one or a few shareholders with more 
than 51 percent of the shares.  This 
domination is not illegal since the KLSE 
listing rules require no more than a pub-
lic float of 25 percent of the total shares 
issued.  Therefore, the listed companies 
still remain as private companies 
(Salleh, 1989). They are public and 
listed only in names. Many of the listed 
companies were labelled by chairman of 
the Malaysian Institute of Economic Re-
search (MIER), Datuk Dr. Kamal Salih, 
as “private-owned public com-
pany” (NST, 21 August 1991). Most 
shares were still held by insiders - fam-
ily members, friends, clan members and 
others known personally to the compa-
nies' founders. It appeared that business 
entities favoured so much the 51 percent 
share or majority control because the 
founders of the family-owned companies 
(who converted their companies to pub-
lic limited companies) were afraid that 
they would lose personal control over 
their companies without the majority 
share (PM Speech, 27 May 1994).   
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That this was the case when it concerned 
the listed companies should not perhaps 
be surprising at all. For after all, the gov-
ernment appears to have led the way 
here. That is, when the NEP had come to 
its unofficial end in mid-1980s and 
where a significant proportion of the 
economy had been transferred - under 
the privatisation exercise - from the gov-
ernment to the private sector needing 
what was proclaimed to be a strong ac-
counting profession, the reality was that 
much of the private sector was still in 
the hands of those associated closely 
with the government sector (see Gomez, 
1997; Jomo, 1995). This section of the 
private sector may even be considered as 
an "extension" of the government sector 
whose reigning politicians and political 
parties had in fact been for many years 
deeply involved in the business sector 
(see Gomez, 1994, 1990; Leigh, 1992; 
Leong, 1988, Chapter Six; and Gale, 
1985). There was merely a superficial 
rearrangement of ownership (Craig, 
1988). As for the so-called privatised 
entities of the former government-held 
companies that were listed at the KLSE, 
the percentage of their shares offered for 
sale had not reached above thirty percent 
of the total shares: MAS, 30 percent; 
MISC, 17 percent; STM, 23.9 percent; 
and TNB, 22.8 percent. Therefore, 
through partial divestment of equity of 
government-owned entities, the govern-
ment was still, at least in the case of 
those companies above, their major 
shareholder. 
 
All in all, in the Malaysian context, it 
may be surmised that those who should 
be able to make a difference in the ac-
counting arena had failed to do the nec-
essary because it was not within their 
interest to have a fully enforced Compa-
nies Act, a strong and respected MIA 
and a well-equipped MASB. In fact, it 
might very well hurt their interests if 
there were to exist strong and respected 
accounting function in the country able 
to play the required role in confronting 
cases of corruption, nepotism and pa-
tron-clientelism that had been present in 
the country for many decades but par-
ticularly in the few years prior to the 
onset of the Asian Financial Crisis.  
 
In particular, for the MIA to be troubled 
by the MACPA in one rivalry episode 
after another was a welcome sight for 
these parties. Not surprisingly, they had 
hardly made any serious move to im-
prove the situation. The fact that the au-
thorities appeared to stay on the sideline 
on this issue of MIA-MACPA rivalry 
was duly noted by a journalist for the 
business magazine Malaysian Business. 
Pauline Almeida, commenting that peo-
ple were questioning the government's 
stance on the problems that arose be-
tween the leaders of the two accounting 
bodies, wrote (Malaysian Business, 16 
Aug. 1988, p. 19):  
 
As yet, there have been no official 
statements that openly indicate the 
taking of sides.  That the Government 
would like to see unity has been 
made clear both a year ago by fi-
nance minister ... and more recently 
by deputy finance minister. But the 
situation is still shrouded in specula-
tion. Loke's [deputy finance minister] 
careful words that no one accoun-
tancy body recognised by the Ac-
countants Act is 'superior or inferior 
to the other' sheds little light.  
 
Nearly a decade later, Editorial of the 
same journal mentioned under the head-
ing "A Profession Divided" the rivalry 
problems of the MIA-MACPA and 
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made suggestion as to the role that the 
"authorities" should play in this matter 
(Malaysian Business, 1 Aug. 1996). The 
Editorial began with the remark that "[i]t 
is a real shame that the accountancy pro-
fession in the country is divided" and 
ended with the following: "The authori-
ties on their part, must make it clear they 
recognise only one national accountancy 
body. There can be no compromise on 
this."   
 
That the MIA was to be weak was per-
haps the intention all along by some par-
ties. This came by not only through hav-
ing the MIA to face the MACPA on its 
own in one episode of rivalry after an-
other, but also when it concerned the 
idea of getting the MIA to play an im-
portant role over national issues. In the 
MIA 1989 Annual Report (p. 7), it was 
stated: “The Institute is being ap-
proached and consulted on various mat-
ters affecting the profession and the 
economy of the country, albeit not to the 
extent the Institute would like it to be.” 
Later, in 1993, Tony Seah, an MIA 
council member and a chartered ac-
countant mentioned that one of the prob-
lems faced by the nation's accounting 
profession was the lack of support from 
the government (Seah, 1993, p. 7). It 
appeared that the MIA had been left out 
in the promulgation and implementation 
of government policies which affected 
the nation's accountants and the public. 
In the same year, the MIA president was 
also quoted to say (NST, 5 May 1993): 
“Our regulatory role has been under-
mined by the lack of cooperation and 
understanding from certain Government 
departments and agencies.” In that news 
report he also said that although the 
MIA was appointed by Parliament to 
represent all accountants in the country, 
it did not receive due recognition as the 
national body of accountants. This he 
said was especially evident in dialogues, 
representations and meetings when rec-
ognition had been persistently accorded 
to the MIA's component body (MACPA 
of course!30). He said that the MIA 
should be viewed as the “sole” medium 
for communication and discussion for 
the accounting profession. He urged the 
government departments and agencies to 
recognise MIA's position as the national 
accounting body.  
 
As perhaps to be expected, the debilitat-
ing state of accounting involving the 
Companies Act, MIA and MASB 
seemed to mirror that in the public sec-
tor. From the then deputy accountant-
general (Akauntan Nasional, Jan. 1990, 
p. 19), he noted that the government op-
eration had been indifferent towards ac-
counting as a tool for effectiveness and 
efficiency. From Tan Sri Ahmad Noor-
din, the following was his remark on 
what took place over value for money 
30    This is not surprising, for there existed over the years 
close bond between the MACPA and various govern-
ment departments and agencies. In the MACPA 1983 
Annual Report (p. 24) this was mentioned by the presi-
dent: “I am happy to say that our Association continues 
to have close rapport with Bank Negara [Central Bank] 
of Malaysia, Ministry of Finance, Registrar of Compa-
nies, Director General of Inland Revenue, Director 
General of Insurance, Association of Banks and Finance 
Companies, Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, Auditor-
General, Accountant-General, and Department of Coop-
eratives in matters where the Association could make 
meaningful contributions. On behalf of our members 
and Council I would like to express the Association's 
deep appreciation to these authorities for the confidence 
they have shown in us.” Similar remarks may also be 
found in numerous other MACPA Annual Reports (see 
for example the MACPA 1985 Annual Report, p. 18; 
the MACPA 1989 Annual Report, p. 29; and the 
MACPA 1990 Annual Report, pp. 23-24.). In the first 
half of 1990s with the stepping down of Tun Daim 
Zainuddin as the finance minister, it appears that the 
MACPA had been working harder to establish a much 
closer relationship with the government (see the 
MACPA 1992 Annual Report, p. 24; MACPA 1994 
Annual Report, p. 19, p. 25). 
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audits in government operations when 
he was holding the post of auditor-
general (Ahmad-Noordin, 1986, p. 47): 
 
We have accordingly amended or 
rather we had the Audit Act 
amended to ensure that the Auditor-
General has the necessary power 
within the law to carry out this value 
for money audit as I mentioned just 
now. What seem to be the constraint 
when I was there was that as value 
for money or performance audit 
penetrates into the activities of gov-
ernments, there is a natural tendency 
for the authorities having the power 
to approve the staff for the Audit 
Office to make it difficult for the 
Audit Office to get the necessary 
skills and manpower to carry out 
this work. 
 
It is a fact that for accounting to reach its 
potential requires transparency in con-
duct, and a situation in which those mak-
ing decisions can be held accountable. 
All these requirements did not fit the 
Malaysian environment as succinctly 
described in mid-1997 by the Editorial 
to the NST  (7 June 1997):  
 
At the pace of its economic growth, 
Malaysia too will feel the vice of cor-
ruption sooner or later. Like others 
before it, this country will also try to 
look the other way, and do as much 
as it can to avoid rocking the eco-
nomic boat.  Like their Asian peers, 
politicians will trust to the moral su-
periority of a few good men to keep 
the others in line.  And there is al-
ways the argument against washing 
dirty linen in public, the stubborn 
loyalty of politicians to their compa-
triots, and an equally obstinate belief 
that corruption is confined to an in-
discreet minority.  In politics, hard 
choices require courage and often 
pose uncertain risks  - which is why 
politicians will try to postpone them 
until their hands are forced.  The in-
stinct of self-preservation will usually 
urge politicians to control the damage 
done by disclosures of corruption, 
rather than attempt to root it out.  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
With the presence of a total of six nause-
ating reasons (in italic), as disclosed by 
the Editorial, there was no question as to 
why corruption in the country could be 
considered to have gone unhampered, 
and as disclosed by the Anti-Corruption 
Agency (ACA), it had been on the rise 
over the last 20 years and stiffer punish-
ment was needed (New Sunday Times, 8 
June 1997). Thus, it appears that what 
happened in the accounting arena in the 
years following the 1985-86 economic 
recession, was deliberate and intended to 
deflect attention from creating a "culture 
of accountability" or full public disclo-
sure, because interested parties do not 
want to face the unnecessary 
"complication" of explaining themselves 
to anyone in their pursuit of gaining eco-
nomic ascendancy – just like what ap-
parently took place earlier during the 
NEP era.  
 
A well-known accounting scholar Bel-
kaoui (1974, as reported by Samuels and 
Piper, 1985, p. 141) has said that a class 
elite in many developing countries is 
interested in maintaining secrecy. Thus, 
the financial reporting system is pur-
posely made to be weak so that it is easy 
for this elite to maintain secrecy for their 
own gain. Notwithstanding their rheto-
ric, it may safely be said that they have 
little interest in seeing changes in the 
status quo. As Rohwer (1995, p. 281) in 
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his acclaimed work on the rising of East 
Asian nations has also succinctly noted, 
"... elites do not normally reform them-
selves or do things to threaten their own 
position". On the state of accounting 
standards applied in these countries in 
particular, he states (p. 292): "For the 
most part, regulation and disclosure 
standards are not at rich-world levels; 
even when they look good on paper, the 
standards are not forced with the same 
zeal that they are in the West." That the 
elites are around leads to the picture that 
they would make it certain for account-
ing to operate in congruence with their 
expectations and objectives. And if 
changes were to take place, they would 
be mobilised in the pursuit of their 
vested interests. Armstrong (1985, 
1987), Hopper et al. (1987), Lehman and 
Tinker (1987), Loft (1986), Miller and 






The period of ten years or so following 
the 1985-86 economic recession saw the 
establishment of the MASB and major 
amendments made to the Companies Act 
1965. However, the former was devoid 
of enforcement power for its accounting 
standards, while the latter over company 
auditor’s reporting duty to ROC is per-
haps nothing more than “scoff law”, for 
it was not enforced by the authorities. 
Their presence had certainly not assisted 
by a revived MIA that had failed to 
show much teeth in the accounting regu-
latory field and which had busied itself 
with promotional activities and rivalry 
with the MACPA. In the face of ac-
counting function failing to arrive to its 
potential, those with the power to make 
a difference had however acted indiffer-
ently.  
 
All in all, the pressure for change com-
ing from the economic recession was 
related directly to the emergence of a 
“modern” system of accounting – but 
not for its effective and appropriate ad-
ministration in the Malaysian social en-
vironment. It created a perceived need 
for "structural" (as oppose to in-depth) 
changes to the accounting system. 
Therefore, the changes that took place in 
the accounting arena have appeared to 
fail to bring it any closer to its potential 
in the nation’s economy. Accounting in 
Malaysia was less than desirable in the 
years following the 1985-86 economic 
recession – just like what happened prior 
to it when the NEP was in full swing.  
 
The debilitating state of accounting dur-
ing the post-NEP era seems to have been 
intended all along by a class elite in the 
society. It may also be deduced that to 
this party the presence of appropriate 
accounting practices and strong and re-
spectful accounting bodies may be a hin-
drance to their continuing efforts to stay 
fully in power and thus able to amass 
wealth uninterrupted.  
 
Thus, it may be concluded that as long 
as very little actually changes in the 
manner that political and economic 
power are distributed among members 
of Malaysian society, the so-called 
change from a predominantly command-
economic system in the 1970s to a more 
capital-market economic system in the 
late 1980s and beyond would not really 
make much difference in the manner that 
accounting is practised and developed in 
the country. In short, based upon what 
had taken place in the period of ten years 
following the 1985-86 economic reces-
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sion, on the face of the distinctive social, 
economic and political attributes sup-
ported by those elites in the government, 
corporate, financial and accounting sec-
tors, the occurrence of intrusive event 
shall not be able to make a big differ-
ence to the pre-existing arrangement in 
accounting which emerged in the early 
1970s with the launching of the NEP.   
 
The so-called changes occurring in the 
accounting system would be mere 
ephemeral than real, structural rather 
than in-depth. The fundamental charac-
ter of accounting in Malaysian society 
would still be intact. It provides the im-
age of corporate governance for the con-
sumption of foreigners, but in actual ef-
fect is hardly to provide more reliable 
financial reports. It is a mere tool among 
so many others to entice those from 
overseas to invest in the country. By 
mid-1997, many of the structural or ex-
plicit elements of the accounting func-
tion were similar to those found in other 
nations. On the other hand, the inner 
perspective to say the least was much 
more complicated - and in turns perplex-
ing. It may thus be understood that basi-
cally accounting in Malaysia is a form of 
cultural importation that has little rele-
vance. As a result, there is superficial 
imitation of western developed coun-
tries' practices. This leads to the percep-
tion that accounting does not matter 
much in Malaysia - whether or not it is 
around and how effective is its function-
ing would not matter much to many par-
ties.  
 
At the onset of the Asian Financial Cri-
sis in 1997, accounting in Malaysia was 
fraught with the uncertainty of a nation 
that was looking to the future with much 
hope and expectations but whose ties 
with the past were still very strong. Ac-
counting like the country itself was at a 
crossroads. While it is not the purpose of 
a study that applies the format of a case 
study to arrive at generalised statements, 
the work does suggest that comparative 
studies looking at the "overt" structural 
forms of accounting practice across na-
tions in an attempt to identify similari-
ties and dissimilarities do not provide a 
valid picture of accounting in action. 
Rather, only on the basis of detailed 
knowledge of the accounting process is 
it possible to come out with a set of reli-
able clustering of accounting practices 
from around the world. A similar con-
clusion applies to the success of stan-
dardisation efforts in accounting at the 
international level, as long as these ef-
forts are based on superficial enquiry 
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